

Justice Delayed: Policy Feedback in South African Land Restitution

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Abstract

Many societies undertake transitional justice programs that aim to address harms committed during a conflict, but these programs often struggle to effectively deliver justice. In this paper, I ask how delays and obstacles to justice feed back into the political activity and attitudes of marginalized groups given literature on the potential mobilizing effects of conflict on its victims. I study the effects of post-apartheid South Africa's onerous land restitution program on land claimants by comparing people with a claim to those who were eligible to claim, but did not. Using a nationally representative survey, I find claiming land is associated with political activity around land, but inversely associated with views that land restitution should be more inclusive. Thus, while participation in onerous programs may increase claimants' political activity to see justice through, obstacles to attaining justice have serious implications for the very communities that such programs are designed to help.

1 Introduction

Governments around the world have begun to approach the issue of righting historical wrongs through the lens of restorative justice and reparations (Lu, 2017). Compensation covers a wide variety of offences, including genocide, internment, enslavement and land dispossession (Anderson, 2011; Komisarchik et al., 2022; Alcantara, 2013; Joon Kim, 2013; Martin and Yaquinto, 2007). Few disagree with the fact that victims of past human rights abuses—committed during war, harsh autocratic or colonial rule and under a supposedly democratic aegis—should receive compensation. Yet many of the processes to get compensation have high bars to prove victimhood and are onerous, drawn-out and legalistic.

While many studies focus on the direct effects of these events on victims, in this paper, I argue that claims procedures themselves can have an independent mediating effect on communities of victims who make a claim for restitution or compensation. Theories of policy feedback show that high barrier and onerous policies introduce new institutions that affect political behaviour and attitudes (Mettler and Soss, 2004; Pierson, 1993). While the literature on historical experience with autocratic regimes, human rights abuses and conflict hypothesizes a number of pathways for citizens to become more or less politically active or altruistic, I argue that contemporary institutions (i.e. claims processes) mediate such long run effects.

I demonstrate that restorative claims processes might affect civic engagement and attitudes towards broader redistribution. Using survey data from 2004 on land restitution to Black South Africans in the post-apartheid era, I exploit policy variation within land reform to study how restorative justice might have unintentional effects on the very people it intends to help. I compare people who made land claims for forced removals under apartheid with those who were forcibly removed but did not make a land claim.

I find that those with experience in the claims process engage in *more* acts of political protest around land issues, but simultaneously they have *less* inclusive policy preferences when it comes to land reform. Claimants are less likely to wish to include other groups in

generous land restitution policies, but no more or less likely to support radical policies both in relation to the general Black population and to those who were dispossessed, but did not engage in the claims process. In contrast, those who reported suffering from a variety of eviction-based and other crimes during the apartheid era are more likely to support more radical and inclusive policies around land reform and more likely to be a part of a number of political organizations, but no more likely to undertake land protests.

Thus, a person's contemporary experiences with onerous claims processes and institutions of restorative justice may simultaneously mobilize and demobilize citizens. While participation in the land claims process may incentivize claimants to use protest and petitions to push their own claims past complicated legal barriers to achieve restitution, participation in restorative justice provides no generalized incentive to push for broader transformation beyond that claim. Instead, a restitution claim may consume the crucial resources of claimant communities in the form of money, time and social capital. Rather than make recipients more supportive of general reform, I argue that these processes may even make land restitution claimants more guarded about the scant resources available to their program and thus less likely to support the introduction of new participants into it.

In this way, past experiences of conflict and experiences with contemporary institutions combine to lead to differences in political belief and action. My conclusions, however, are not intended to disparage the idea of restorative justice. Justice itself does not decrease demands for inclusive and radical redistributive policies. Instead, what dampens pursuits of broader justice are the requirements that claimants must clear massive—and potentially impassable—hurdles to receive that justice in the first place. Designers of restorative justice programs must be cognisant of the potential financial, emotional and social burdens that the claims process places on already victimized and marginalized communities in their quest to achieve some form of justice for past wrongs.

2 Historical Experiences, Contemporary Policies and Political Activity

Victimization, repression and conflict have long run effects on those who experience them. Evidence from violence in Africa (Blattman, 2009; Berens and Karim, 2020; Voors et al., 2012), Europe (Wayne and Zhukov, 2022; Mironova and Whitt, 2016), Latin America (Bateson, 2012) and Asia (Gilligan et al., 2014) find that a diverse set of conflict experiences lead to increased political activity and altruistic attitudes for victims. Conflict can change victims' behaviour and attitudes in a surprisingly progressive and lasting way to ensure that such a devastating event does not happen again.

Outside of conflict settings, studies have shown that victimization has more mixed long run effects. Crime experience may mobilize political participation (Sønderskov et al., 2020; Bateson, 2012), but could also demobilize citizens (Ley, 2018). Analysis of interned Japanese Americans shows that World War II era internment led to less political engagement (Komisarchik et al., 2022). Similarly, experience with oppression under authoritarian states and democratic transitions have varied effects. Some find that repression leads to regime loyalty (Wang, 2021; Zhukov and Talibova, 2018; Rozenas and Zhukov, 2019; Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2017), while religious minorities experiencing repression see greater participation and identification with minority group politics (Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017).

These findings locate the impetus for political participation and belief in events in the past (Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017). But what role do post-transition or post-conflict dynamics play in the lead up to participation by those who suffered repression? How do contemporaneous institutions shape political beliefs? Rosenfeld (2021) finds that post-transition state employment dampened democratic attitudes in Eastern Europe, while Pop-Eleches et al. (2022) shows that protest participation after democratic transitions increases democratic attitudes. Drawing on the literature on policy feedback, I argue that the institutions developed to address past abuses can themselves have an effect on those who are meant to be

compensated.

Specific government policies—especially those that bring benefits to recipients of those policies—affect how people behave and what they believe. Thus, both past marginalization and contemporary policy influence attitudes and behaviour.

In the United States, studies focus on the difference between programs with high barriers to entry, such as paternalistic means-tested programs, and those with more universal benefits. Programs with stringent conditions tend to decrease people’s feelings of political efficacy via engagement and political participation, while universal ones have more positive effects on recipients (Campbell, 2011; Bruch et al., 2010; Mettler and Soss, 2004). The difference between programs stems in large part from conditions that force a participant prove their need for a benefit, which disparages participants by labelling them as ‘poor’ and emphasizing the temporary nature of benefits. Uneven service delivery affects Americans’ engagement with politics when cuts are made to schools (Nuamah, 2020) and healthcare (Michener, 2018). Likewise, in India, negative experiences with state services depress claims-making for the urban poor (Auerbach and Kruks-Wisner, 2020).

However, other studies in developing societies show that incomplete or uneven programming can mobilize intended recipients to push for better services. Decreases in public goods provisions in Africa lead people to be more likely to participate in politics (MacLean, 2011), while participation in judicial claims processes in South Africa led to increased engagement with the court system (Taylor, 2020a). Often, uneven or incomplete service delivery leads to greater political participation in order to improve services (Hern, 2017a,b, 2019). Similarly, South African voters support opposition parties in areas with better service delivery (De Kadt and Lieberman, 2017). Increased political participation often stems from ineffective, incomplete or insufficient services that lead people to push for greater access.

3 Theory

While past experience with repression and oppression can have an effect on current political behaviour and attitudes, contemporary interactions and experiences—especially negative experiences—with state institutions can also feed into both political behaviour and attitudes. In this paper, I present a theory of how long-run effects of historical oppression interact with contemporary initiatives to provide justice for that oppression. I argue that contemporary institutions mediate the effects of historical experiences to produce divergent outcomes based on whether a victim of a conflict participates in contemporary programs of redress.

Those who have lived through conflict or authoritarian rule may be more or less predisposed to engage in political activism and to hold progressive attitudes in the post-conflict period. But we also know that many such victims might qualify for restorative justice programs, which constitute new institutions with which people must interact. These programs often involve a process by which people must prove their victimhood or participate in reconciliation-based restorative programs, which in turn often require a degree of ‘truth-telling’ that may in fact be retraumatizing for those involved (Allan and Allan, 2000; Hayner, 2001; Mendeloff, 2004).

Similar to means-tested programs, restorative justice often creates high bars that claimants must clear to qualify for the promised benefits. While high bars for qualification and onerous processes to obtain benefits should *decrease* political activity and efficacy through feelings of disillusionment with the state, uneven service delivery in developing states may serve to *increase* engagement to ensure that one receives certain benefits. I argue that each of these effects condition the political behaviour and attitudes of people in transitional justice settings. Different types of victims may emerge from settings of intergroup conflict and participation in programs of redress. I disaggregate four different categories of victimhood to elaborate a theory on how claims making and restorative justice affects victims of conflict: general citizens, victims, potential claimants and claimants. I outline these categories in Table 1.

	Participation in Claims	No Participation in Claims
Potential Claimants	Claimant Victim	Eligible Non-Claimant Victim
Other Direct Conflict Experience	N/A	Victim
Indirect Conflict Experience	N/A	General Citizens

Table 1: Victim Disaggregation

Each *citizen* in society in conflict is affected by the conflict. However, only a few identify as *victims* of that conflict, whether due to displacement, violence or other crimes committed against them. Of those victims, potential claimants meet the cut-off bars to qualify for generous restorative justice through an onerous process to prove and negotiate one’s compensation. But only those potential claimants who make a claim are *claimants*, while those potential claimants who do not make a claim are *eligible non-claimants*.

I generate a series of hypotheses from these theories about political behaviour and attitudes. First, I look at hypotheses around political activity. The works above argue that three types of people will be more likely to participate in politics: those who have been victims of conflict, those who have experienced easily accessible benefits (i.e. not onerous) and those who have had uneven governmental service.

My first hypotheses stems from the literature on violence, war and victimhood. As demonstrated above, many have cited the galvanizing effects of conflict on people that lead them to seek to improve their lives. Those who do not experience violence directly during a conflict, however, should not be any more likely to participate.

Hypothesis 1a: Victims of a conflict are more likely than regular citizens to participate politically.

I then hypothesize that the effects of victimhood change when a process of restorative justice is involved. Past experiences and contemporary experiences can combine to create puzzling effects. While some find that if victims of conflict receive reparations (Voytas, 2020), they participate publicly at higher rates, others find that unsatisfying participation has the opposite effect (Kruks-Wisner, 2021). In other words, onerous policies that drag on and fail

to meet expectations can actually spur political activity to ensure that their claim is met. If a government promises to deliver something to a group and fails to, citizens within that group will push even harder to claim their benefits. Here, I predict that contemporary experience with incomplete, onerous or uneven programs may provoke even greater participation than experience as a victim, but only on their claim and not in general.

Hypothesis 1b: Claimants of restorative justice are more likely to participate politically in issues related to their claims, but not in general.

Additionally, I move my thinking beyond mere political activity and also make hypotheses about general political preferences. Victims of conflict, as argued above, have been found to have more altruistic (Voors et al., 2012) and pro-social or inclusive (Mironova and Whitt, 2016; Gilligan et al., 2014; Berens and Karim, 2020) political and distributional preferences. Thus, conflict experience may alter the nature of that participation by making people intent on creating a fairer and more equitable post-conflict society.

Hypothesis 2a: Victims of a conflict will be more supportive of inclusive and radical policies than regular citizens.

However, I posit that onerous or drawn-out restorative justice processes will make claimants more averse to extending their generous benefit schemes. If one has fought so hard for high benefits that have yet to arrive, then one may be even less likely to want to include further people into the claimant process to slow it down even further. Claimants will be less likely to advocate inclusion of other groups into the qualification pool for restorative justice and given that they already have a guarantee of compensation, they will be less likely to advocate for more radical policies to bring that compensation to others.

Hypothesis 2b: Claimants will be less supportive of inclusive and radical policies than non-claimant victims.

4 Case: South Africa's Restitution Program

To study the effects of claims institutions on political behaviour and attitudes, I rely on the case of South Africa. South Africa is a critical case for studies of transitional justice and post-conflict societies. Its Truth and Reconciliation Commission is often held up as a paragon of truth telling (Gibson and Gouws, 1999) and is seen as a place of political and social activism (Lockwood, 2022), campaigns for more thorough rights (Taylor, 2020b) and substantial economic redistribution (Lieberman, 2022). Many place the country in direct conversation with other post-conflict countries undergoing transitional justice and redistribution, like Colombia (Taylor, 2020b), El Salvador (Wood, 2001), Chile (Walsh, 2012) and Brazil (Lieberman and McClendon, 2013).

Ultimately, South Africa's attempt to provide concrete compensation for land has faltered (Atuahene, 2014; Ngcukaitobi, 2021). In this section, I rely on ten author conducted qualitative interviews (discussed in the appendix) and secondary literature to outline the struggles faced by land reform claimants in South Africa. Under colonialism and apartheid, Black South Africans were made second-class citizens, disenfranchized, subject to unjust detention, heavily policed and excluded from power by the white minority. Through law, the apartheid state prevented Black South Africans from owning land and forcibly evicted them from their homes in rural and urban areas to 'return' them to their designated 'homelands'. At the end of apartheid in 1994, Black South Africans controlled only 13% of the land in the country despite the fact that they made up over 80% of the population.

The new government, elected under a fully enfranchized democracy in 1994, made it a goal to give back land taken from Black South Africans through three programs. The first of these land reform programs is 'restitution'. The government hoped to use the restitution program to provide concrete justice and restoration for the victims of apartheid's massive campaign of racial land dispossession. Specifically, the 1913 Land Act banned purchases of and ownership of land by non-white South Africans in white-designated areas (Plaatje, 1982), while the 1957 Group Areas Act looked to do the same for urban areas. the apartheid

government forcibly removed and relocated over 3.5 million Black, Coloured¹ and Indian South Africans from their homes by 1982 across the country (Platzky and Walker, 1985).

Restitution required claimants to demonstrate that they were 1) a community 2) from whom the government had taken land using a racially based law 3) after (and including) the 1913 Land Act. These requirements presented high barriers for those who sought to claim this form of restorative justice. To start with, many Black and Coloured communities in the Western and Southern parts of the country (e.g. the Xhosa and Xhosi San) lost their land well before the 1913 cut-off (Beinart (2001); Bundy (1972); Ngcukaitobi (2018)). But there are still many potential land claims where late dispossession and dispossession of privately held urban or rural land took place.

Under the ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ land reform program, the state required the existing white landowner to volunteer to sell their land for a certain price and for the government to agree to pay that price. As attempts to part an owner with their property tend to do, this model led to many court challenges within the established Land Claims Court where a multitude of disputes could derail restitution claims on the grounds of the timeline (i.e. was the dispossession before 1913?), the nature of the dispossession (i.e. was the dispossession the result of an explicitly race-based law?) or the coherence of the claimant ‘community’. As one land claims bureaucrat described to the author in an interview, white farmers could force the land claim to court by contesting the validity of the claim if they did not like the asking price for their land. The bureaucrat outlined that:

“A lot of [white] farmers agree to sell, but mostly on the condition that they like the price you put on the table regardless of whether the claim is valid. If they don’t like the offer, then they contest the validity of the claim.”²

¹Coloured is a term used in South Africa to define a specific group of mixed race, often Afrikaans speaking, South Africans. While it has its roots in outdated apartheid terminology, it is still a self-invoked and official term for an ethnic group.

²Author Interview with Land Claims Official II, October, 2019. Gauteng.

To make their restitution claim, claimants often needed to hire an entire team of experts. One interviewee outlined that some cases require several separate external actors: an attorney, an advocate, a property valuer and an anthropologist or historian (to ascertain that it was a true “tribal claim”) and that “no one has these resources”³ This dilemma was made even harder by the fact that the Land Claims Court had no real permanent staff of judges, and instead relied on lawyers and judges to allocate their own time to resolving these issues on a part time basis.⁴ Thus, hearings were inconsistent, spread out and infrequent.

An established farmer who had recently bought land brought up that there were dozens of claims on his land, which all stemmed from a group of people descended from one chief. In his opinion, the 40+ claims on his land had no chance of leading to a successful claim because “if one of these claims is valid, then they all are and they can’t sort it out...” due to infighting.⁵ He elaborated further, saying that these land claims “never [go] to court... [because] the moment you challenge the validity of a claim it disappears into the legal system for a decade”. A land bureaucrat argued that white farmers had developed a coherent and coordinated strategy to challenge the validity land claims to send the process into courts before settling it out of court for the original asking price, arguing that the process “is no longer individuals against each other, it is an institutional position [on the part of white farmers] taken to push back against government policy.”⁶

Even if a community is lucky enough to receive land, other administrative hurdles and intra-community disputes over which communities, family members or sub-groups claimed land led to further delays, costs and obstacles. One land claimant described that while their community had gained one third of their lost land through the restitution process, they struggled to make a living because much of the best agricultural land under claim was still held by various white farmers.⁷ A different land claimant outlined how their claim

³Author Interview with lawyer I, October, 2019. Gauteng.

⁴Author Interview with lawyer II, October, 2019. Gauteng.

⁵Author Interview with farmer, February, 2020. Gauteng.

⁶Author Interview with Land Claims Official, October, 2019. Gauteng.

⁷Author Interview with Land Claimant I, January, 2020. Gauteng.

was still embroiled in court proceedings as of 2020 because the community's local traditional authorities wanted to profit off of the mineral wealth on the land and exclude the community. The claimant outlined that "the issue is that we are still in court. In December we appointed [an expert] witness...because most of the elders had passed. We only rely on oral evidence and research from the archives."⁸

A third land claimant discussed the extent of local organisation undertaken by their community under apartheid. During apartheid and under exile from their rural home, "in Soweto my clan...conducted monthly meetings and formed a stokvel [credit union] where every month they met initially to help one another in terms of data. Amongst other things we talked about how we could get our land back."⁹ The claimant went on, saying that they still hold meetings "to pressure the government to bring the land back to the extent that the South African Council of Churches got involved". But despite this activism and pressure, the government was only able to return a quarter of some of the most marginal the land that community originally claimed.

Another land claimant and organizer outlined to the author how their community had been awarded the land they lost in by 2001 after lodging their claim in 1994. However, various administrative difficulties within the government, the selection of a 'strategic partner' to help the land reform project and a lack of funds to pay for a development grant means that even in 2019, they had still not been able to settle and farm on their land.¹⁰ These stories are common and much of the land purchased for restitution has yet to be transferred to the claimants (Ramutsindela et al., 2016).

These experiences demonstrate the obstacles to land claimants. As the cases drag on and new objections to the claim arise from different angles, the original people who remember the dispossession pass away and oral evidence becomes harder, more external or indirect and more expensive to provide. These sorts of reports are well documented in the general

⁸Author Interview with Land Claimant II, January, 2020. Gauteng.

⁹Author Interview with Land Claimant III, January, 2020. Gauteng.

¹⁰Author Interview with Land Claimant IV, October, 2019. Gauteng.

literature on land restitution in South Africa beyond the author's interviews. In the high profile Richtersveld claim, a landholding corporation took the claimant to court to argue that the dispossession had happened before 1913 before before arguing that the Act that removed them from their land was 'racially neutral' (Everingham and Jannecke, 2006, p.558). While an NGO took on the case and won the land for the community in the Constitutional Court, such problems often result when the case becoming mired in legal battles and without an assisting legal organization, claimant communities are ill-prepared to fight in court alone.

Other studies have documented how defining a group as a "community" can have negative effects that may have on claimants, especially when there are overlapping claims. (Kepe 1999) argues that making benefits conditional on community leads to overlapping claims and conflicts within a group of claimants about who should benefit. While many find that engaging in claims empower communities to take on their own causes (Kepe, 1999; Jannecke, 2008; Beyers and Fay, 2015), (Bohlin, 2004) shows that claimants can disagree about whether to take cash or land-based compensation and that both formats can open up the community to further disputes.

In other cases, traditional authorities, local councillors or even wealthy claimants contest the claim from within, turning a claim and its governing Communal Property Association (CPA) or Trust into a battleground. These disputes are compounded by bureaucratic backlogs because "the process gets very drawn out and opens up the potential for intra-community disputes compounded by weak public administration"¹¹

An additional hurdle for potential land claimants is that there was a deadline by which one had to lodge a claim of December 31st, 1998. Many were not aware of the cut-off and the government did not sufficiently publicize the process (Atuahene, 2014). Thus, in addition to those who could not claim because of the 1913 start date for claims and those who could not claim because of high barriers to entry, some did not claim because they were unaware of the process. In total, 368,000 households lodged just under 80,000 claims over more than

¹¹Author Interview with development professional, November, 2019. Gauteng.

three million hectares of land. Given the numbers of forcibly removed people calculated by Platzky and Walker (1985), there are many households and their descendants who could have claimed, but did not. As Atuahene (2014) demonstrates in her discussion of last minute claims, the reasons for claiming were often quite arbitrary.

These dynamics South Africa’s restitution program is a deeply compelling case for understanding how restorative justice and victimhood may affect both political behaviour and attitudes. The program has a generous, but onerous, difficult and slow restorative justice process, which not only runs alongside a less generous program (redistribution), but also includes a relatively arbitrary cut-off to make claims.¹² Some people who had legitimate restitution claims were thus excluded from the process because they were not aware of the deadline.

5 Research Design

5.1 Survey and Timing

To analyse attitudes around land claimants in South Africa, I use data from a survey designed by James Gibson in 2004 with 4,108 South Africans on land policy attitudes. Within the survey, I narrow in on 1,549 Black respondents.¹³ The timing of this survey is opportune for the study the opinions of land restitution claimants. First, it was done more than five years after the 1998 cut-off date, which was enough time for people to have experience with the claims process after the state prioritized land restitution over redistribution between 1999 and 2001, thinking that it would lead to faster results than the faltering redistribution program. But the problems described above plagued the process and the government. The government resorted to buying out land claimants using compensation that was only adjusted

¹²Importantly, a new claims process was opened up in 2014 to bring more people into the restitution process, but the survey evidence outlined below occurred ten years before.

¹³Gibson sampled within each of South Africa’s four apartheid racial categories (Black, White, Coloured and Indian) and designed weights to be used in each sub-group.

to the price of land at the time of dispossession, which was often much lower than the current asking price for land (especially urban land).¹⁴

By 2004, of the provinces with major rural claims (i.e. over 100,000ha), only one had transferred half of the land claimed in the process. In the two provinces with the largest number of rural claims and hectareage claimed, the government had less than 20% of all land claimed by the restitution process respectively in each province. Thus, there were many people in these areas who had made rural claims and had not received land. With urban claims, claimants found themselves compensated at the value of their homes 40 years ago in neighbourhoods where private developers were profiting immensely from building high rises in growing urban neighbourhoods on one's former land. In some cases, such as the District Six case in Cape Town, land claimants are still in court trying to get their land.

5.2 Dependent Variables

The two sets of dependent variables against which I test my hypotheses are each drawn from a set of questions from Gibson's 2004 survey. I use seven questions on activism, nine on group membership and 12 questions on policy attitudes are outlined in Table 7.

First, I look at six questions that ask whether the respondent has participated in a form of land activism. These questions ask whether the respondent has done each activity.¹⁵ I code only the answers in the affirmative (i.e. the respondent has actually done the activity) as 1, with all other responses as 0 and non-responses as missing. I use OLS models to analyse this measure and include the logit models in the appendix (Tables 19 and 20). To examine broader political participation, I look at group membership in eight groups: religious, labour, party, community, youth, women's, business, farm and rate payers' organizations, paying specific attention to labour and political organizations.

For the second set of hypotheses, I look at 12 questions on land policy attitudes. I group

¹⁴ Author Interview with Land Claims Official I, September 2019, Cape Town.

¹⁵ 3 "Have actually done", 2 "Might do" 1 "Would never do".

these into two sets of questions. First, seven questions ask about *who* should get land (Q1-4, Q8, Q10 and Q12). These questions effectively ask the respondent about the degree to which land reform should be inclusive of those who are not covered by the generous policies for land restitution claimants. For example, questions 1-3 provide a number of scenarios about new groups who should be eligible to have land ‘returned’ to them: those who lost it under apartheid,¹⁶ those who lost it throughout the colonial period¹⁷ and those who work on farms¹⁸. Questions 4 and 12 deal with the issue of providing protections or land to squatters—who are currently not covered by any land reform law with greater protection. I inversely code these to make the ‘inclusive’ answers be higher values to fit with the trend in the questions. Question 10 then asks about extending land reform more thoroughly to those living in communal areas that were always Black controlled by asking whether “tribal leaders” should hand over their land to those who live on it. Finally, question 11 inquires about equal access to land reform along gender lines.

I also look at the remaining five policy questions that ask about how the government might quicken the pace of redistributing land (Q5-7, Q8, Q11). These questions better measure the desire to make land reform more radical by increasing taxes on white South Africans (Q6) and the general population (Q11) to pay for land reform, whether the government should forcibly purchase (Q5) or expropriate (Q7) land and whether redistributed land should be prioritized for Black commercial farmers (Q8).¹⁹

Notably, for each of the land policy questions, most Black South Africans answered that they agreed with the more radical or inclusive approach. As Gibson (2009) finds in his own analysis of the data, race is a key driver of differences in land policy. The mean for nearly all of these questions for Black South Africans is at least above 3 and often above 4 (see table 9). There are similarly high means for all variables except for questions on squatters, as Black

¹⁶As opposed to those who lost land regardless of the type of law that dispossessed them.

¹⁷As opposed to those who lost land after 1913.

¹⁸Who often do not have much recourse to gain control of land.

¹⁹In the appendix, I look at several questions on what factors a respondent considers to be most important for driving policy to further test these hypotheses.

respondents are slightly against squatter rights. In contrast, white South Africans largely oppose the more radical policies (Gibson, 2010). Thus, for each of these policy questions, any change must be interpreted in light of the overwhelming preference for these policies among Black South Africans. For example, a small positive and significant change will be indicative of quite a large change given ceiling effects that leave minimal room for upward movement. Further, a small negative change will not indicate that a subgroup opposes the policy proposal, but rather that they support it slightly less than other Black South Africans.

While Table 9 shows that there is a baseline of positive views on radical and inclusive land redistribution in the country among Black South Africans, there is minimal land activism among the general population. No more than 7% of respondents declared any one type of land activism. While there is a large demand for land or at least radical land policies among Black South Africans, few people in the survey acted on those policy beliefs.

5.3 Explanatory Variables and Controls

My main explanatory variables come from three different and self-reported measures of land loss. The measure for having made a claim in the restitution process is a question that directly asks respondents whether respondents “Have made a claim before a government agency” in the land restitution process. Gibson codes the question on a 1-5 scale asking whether the statement applies to the respondent and I maintain this coding²⁰. In his own analysis, Gibson (2009) keeps this measure as a 5-point variable, but I code it as binary as people will know if they have made a claim (1, “probably” or “definitely”.) and I code everyone other non-missing case as not having done so (0). I use this binary indicator as a robustness check in the appendix (Tables 10, 11 and 12) of the indicator I discuss below.

I compile an indicator that asks whether someone can not be a claimant, could be a claimant and is a claimant. Here, I use one question that asks whether one or one’s family

²⁰The scale is as follows: 1 “Definitely Does not”, 2 “Probably Does not”, 3 “Don’t Know”, 4 “Probably applies” and 5 “Definitely applies”

	No forced removal	Forced removal
No Land Claim	974	<i>336</i>
Land Claim		212

Table 2: Claimant Status among Black South Africans in Survey, with Eligible Non-claimants in italics and Eligible Claimants in bold

had been “subjected to a forced removal”²¹ The scale here is the same for the land claimant question (i.e. whether it applies) and I keep the same coding (probably and definitely) as an affirmative.

Because “forced removals” may be interpreted as anything from evictions to general feelings of dispossession, I control I do not include any person as having experienced a forced removal if they did not self-report an awareness of the land claims process. This measure drops 273 respondents who claimed to have a forced removal and in the appendix in Tables 21, 22 and 23, I run a model where the baseline category is all those who reported a forced removal, but made no claim. I code a three category variable. First, those who did not have a valid land claim. Second, those who had a valid land claim but did not make a land claim. Third, those who had a valid land claim and made their land claim. For the purpose of my analysis, I use the category of potential claimants without a claim as the baseline to evaluate the difference between land claimants and those who did not claim. I include the full survey results for the questions on land claims and forced removals in Table 2.

While there are arbitrary cut-offs that define this category as discussed above, I do not treat this study as a natural experiment for a number of reasons. First, there are a number of important covariates on which the two categories are not balanced, as shown in Table 3. Many people may not have made a claim in time for the 1998 cut-off for submission, and this decision could have been informed by variables that predict access to resources. As 3

²¹These questions come from a broader series of questions that begin with: “As a result of the history of our country, many South Africans believe that they have been unfairly deprived of land or land rights that is rightfully theirs. We are interested in whether you or your immediate family is involved in any of these issues. Do any of the following apply to you?”.

Table 3: Balance Between Eligible Non Claimants and Claimants

	Eligible Non-Claimants	Claimants	Difference	
	mean	mean	b	p
Rural	0.43	0.30	0.13**	(0.01)**
Poor	0.83	0.82	0.02	(0.64)
Age Cat	5.01	4.46	0.55*	(0.04)*
Gender	0.51	0.48	0.03	(0.52)
educ	6.53	7.25	-0.73*	(0.02)*
Close to TA	0.37	0.36	0.01	(0.90)
Observations	169	212	381	

shows, claimants are much more likely to be urban, younger and educated.

These attributes could also predict various political behaviours and attitudes. For example, urban residents may be more likely to have more property-rights preserving views, while more educated people may be more politically active. However, by controlling for these potential confounders, I believe that this measure does capture the effect of the claims process in its comparison between those who claimed and those who could have claimed, but for some reason did not.

The other explanatory variables of note examine the alternative hypotheses about how generalized apartheid-era victimhood may affect one’s behaviour and attitudes. The first explanatory variable of interest is whether someone suffered a at the hands of the apartheid regime. This is an independent question, as used by [Gibson \(2009\)](#). 29% of all Black South Africans answered this question in the affirmative.

As a robustness check, I use a compiled term that sums each of nine specific harm questions under apartheid (coding only the positive responses as having suffered that crime). The specific harms are: required to move residence, lost job, assaulted by police, imprisoned by authorities, psychological harm, denied access to education, unable to associate across racial boundaries and had to use a pass to move. On this measure, 50% of Black South Africans answered that they had not experienced one of these crimes. However, this increase may be because of some form of social desirability bias on the part of those who did not want to answer specific questions about their own victimhood. I add an additional robustness

check in Tables 24, 25 and 26 show that the harm measure does not affect the claimant measure by dropping the harm measure from the regression.

I thus include other controls that could contribute to spurious associations between my main explanatory variables and my outcomes. I draw each of these from the Gibson survey. First, I include a binary variable for the rural status of the respondent given that rural and urban respondents may have different exposure to service delivery and the state (Auerbach and Kruks-Wisner, 2020) or may have measurably different attitudes on the type of land reform they would hope to see. Second, I include a binary control for the class of the respondent as that might affect what sort of claims a victim may make (Taylor, 2020a) or even what sort of land reform they would want to see. Rich or urban Black South Africans may desire more status-quo enforcing land reform given their investment in the urban economy than a radical land reform program that could risk that very economy.

I also include a binary control for gender given the gendered division of rural and urban labour in South Africa and the fact that many women are excluded from land holding by traditional authorities (Sihlali, 2018). Finally, I include controls for age and education in the main regressions. One might imagine that older South Africans could be more attached to the land they lost compared to the ‘born free’ generation, and thus I include a continuous variable based around the 11 age categories in the survey. Additionally, I control for education, which I measure as a continuous variable from a 10-point categorical scale from least to highest levels of education. Those who are more educated, potentially, could be making more land claims, acting for themselves and holding certain political beliefs. Finally, knowledge of the land claims process could be a result of having a land claim and could itself affect one’s advocacy and beliefs about the land reform process and thus I include a continuous variable based on Gibson’s own measure of a respondent’s knowledge of the land claims process in addition to other questions on awareness of South African land dispossession in the Appendix (Tables 13 to 15).

5.4 Models

I use OLS models to estimate both the binary indicators for H1a and H1b (see appendix for logistic regressions) and the 1-5 scale variables for H2a and H2b. Where x are the above covariates and β' are the associated coefficients.

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + \dots + \beta_n x_n + u_i$$

6 Analysis

Below I present analysis to test these hypotheses. I present three sets of tests on political activity and policy preferences in both table and coefficient plot format. The evidence here is presented in a series of coefficient plots with 90% confidence intervals that show both the eligible claimant versus eligible non-claimant (claimant) and victim status (harmed by apartheid).

6.1 Activism and Political Engagement

First, I examine the determinants of political activity and participation. Table 4 and Figure 1 show how both claimant status and victim status correlate with land protest activity. Victims are no more likely on a number of indicators to undertake political activism around land except in refusing to pay levies.

In contrast, the differences between being a claimant and having not made a claim are stark. Those who made a claim are more likely to undertake land occupations, make land protests, lodge formal complaints, sign petitions and engage in levy boycotts than eligible non-claimants. Therefore, people in the land claims process undertake much more land-related activism than those who were forcibly removed, but general victims of apartheid are no more likely to undertake this activity.

Figure 1: Political Activity by Claimant Status, Base=Eligible Non-Claimants




Table 4: Claimant Category vs Eligible Non Claimants on Activity

	Occupation	Protest	Complaint	Petition	Boycott	Levy Strike
[1em] Ineligible	0.00181 (0.0150)	-0.0103 (0.0229)	-0.00434 (0.0194)	0.0225 (0.0154)	-0.0285 (0.0221)	-0.000126 (0.0161)
Claimant	0.0927*** (0.0281)	0.0664** (0.0332)	0.119*** (0.0362)	0.0579** (0.0260)	0.0212 (0.0318)	0.0444* (0.0263)
Harmed by Apartheid	0.00986 (0.0145)	0.00976 (0.0161)	0.0390** (0.0194)	0.0241 (0.0168)	0.0138 (0.0160)	0.0431*** (0.0166)
Rural	0.00447 (0.0118)	-0.0214* (0.0117)	-0.0242* (0.0140)	-0.0172 (0.0131)	-0.0185 (0.0125)	-0.0344*** (0.0110)
Poor	-0.0151 (0.0150)	0.0179 (0.0134)	0.0117 (0.0166)	-0.00736 (0.0174)	0.0122 (0.0139)	-0.0173 (0.0155)
Age Cat	-0.00569** (0.00256)	-0.000208 (0.00341)	-0.00123 (0.00410)	-0.000975 (0.00374)	-0.00189 (0.00330)	-0.00254 (0.00288)
Gender	-0.00748 (0.0116)	-0.00791 (0.0121)	-0.0204 (0.0137)	-0.0120 (0.0127)	-0.00947 (0.0120)	-0.0116 (0.0108)
educ	-0.00190 (0.00260)	-0.00105 (0.00329)	-0.00138 (0.00379)	0.00142 (0.00322)	-0.000589 (0.00311)	-0.00256 (0.00238)
Constant	0.0773** (0.0379)	0.0570 (0.0432)	0.0716 (0.0524)	0.0376 (0.0449)	0.0836* (0.0443)	0.0894** (0.0369)
Observations	1382	1392	1387	1367	1388	1358
R-squared	0.027	0.020	0.043	0.011	0.011	0.028

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

When compared to estimates of likely participation in various political organizations, the relationship is reversed. Figure 2 and Table 5 show that while claimants are not more likely to join groups at a higher rate than citizens or non-claimants, those who were harmed by apartheid are often more likely to be a member of labour unions, political parties, business groups and farm groups. Therefore, general political participation in civil society organizations is predicted by past victimhood, but land activism is predicted by claimant status.

Figure 2: Claimant Group Membership




Table 5: Claimant Category vs Eligible Non Claimants on Group Membership

	Religious	Labour	Political Party	Community Action	Youth Group	Women's Group	Business Group	Farm Group	Rate Payers Group
[1em] Ineligible	-0.0756* (0.0416)	0.0126 (0.0176)	-0.00176 (0.0309)	-0.0100 (0.0162)	-0.0920*** (0.0317)	-0.00776 (0.0257)	0.000203 (0.0159)	0.0140*** (0.00495)	-0.00184 (0.00672)
Clamaint	-0.0918* (0.0534)	0.00154 (0.0242)	0.0355 (0.0419)	0.0110 (0.0213)	-0.0287 (0.0393)	-0.00135 (0.0309)	-0.00819 (0.0196)	0.00407 (0.00421)	0.00598 (0.0114)
Harmed by Apartheid	-0.0206 (0.0321)	0.0219 (0.0159)	0.0906*** (0.0248)	0.0196 (0.0125)	-0.00856 (0.0172)	0.00331 (0.0171)	0.0353** (0.0138)	0.0142* (0.00730)	0.0126 (0.00799)
Rural	0.0199 (0.0274)	-0.0440*** (0.0106)	-0.0341* (0.0180)	-0.00922 (0.00927)	-0.00196 (0.0177)	-0.0139 (0.0132)	0.00441 (0.00819)	0.0137** (0.00561)	-0.0111*** (0.00374)
Poor	-0.0784** (0.0340)	-0.0583*** (0.0199)	-0.0236 (0.0235)	-0.0229* (0.0137)	-0.0366 (0.0246)	-0.0177 (0.0168)	-0.0159 (0.0123)	-0.0107 (0.00778)	-0.00888 (0.00776)
Age Cat	0.0189*** (0.00673)	0.0115*** (0.00294)	0.00795* (0.00449)	0.00583** (0.00273)	-0.0255*** (0.00387)	0.0160*** (0.00370)	0.00463* (0.00246)	0.00556** (0.00218)	0.00117 (0.00124)
Gender	0.226*** (0.0274)	-0.0453*** (0.0114)	-0.0700*** (0.0186)	-0.0249*** (0.00939)	-0.0345** (0.0172)	0.104*** (0.0119)	-0.0174** (0.00839)	-0.00487 (0.00510)	-0.0133*** (0.00404)
educ	0.0109* (0.00623)	0.0103*** (0.00275)	0.00145 (0.00459)	0.00344 (0.00250)	0.00764** (0.00338)	-0.000967 (0.00337)	0.00664*** (0.00209)	0.00231 (0.00162)	0.00164* (0.000836)
Constant	0.470*** (0.0848)	0.000424 (0.0353)	0.132** (0.0564)	0.0193 (0.0298)	0.266*** (0.0565)	-0.0230 (0.0488)	-0.0357 (0.0310)	-0.0409* (0.0210)	0.00697 (0.0119)
Observations	1450	1450	1450	1450	1450	1450	1450	1450	1450
R-squared	0.072	0.066	0.041	0.022	0.079	0.088	0.030	0.033	0.024

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Thus, I find mixed support for my hypotheses around political activity: different types of victims have different kinds of political activity. A key driver of increased political engagement through activism could be down to more institutional features that are a feature of the post-conflict era. Rather than changing behaviour due to a sense of political efficacy, land claimants are politically active because they want to achieve justice and compensation for the wrongs committed against them under conflict. This activity comes through a desire to see their formal land claims succeed and have their land returned. Land reform claimants must participate in a land claims process that led them into conflict with white farmers, the judiciary, traditional authorities and their own community.

6.2 Land Policy Attitudes

Figure 3 and Table 6 demonstrate tests of the second hypotheses. They show clearly that those who were harmed under apartheid have nearly universally inclusive land reform attitudes. Compared to the average Black South African, they are somewhat more in favour of extending generous land reform policies to those who lost land under apartheid and colonialism as well as farm workers, squatters, women and those in communal land. Equally, victims of apartheid are somewhat more supportive of stances that push for adopting radical policies around land reform. Compared to the average Black South African, victims are less likely to favour productive farmers, but they are in favour of increasing taxes, forcing farmers to sell and even expropriating land. Victims of apartheid are thus more radical and inclusive when it comes to land reform than the average South African.

While the coefficients are relatively small on a five-point scale (between 0.1 and 0.4), they remain the best predictors of attitudes out of the variables in the multivariate regression. Further, given that many of the variables already represent a mean agreement among the Black population, there are some ceiling effects that make these positive coefficients more important.

Additionally, Figure 3 and Table 6 show support for Hypothesis 2b. Land claimants

are marginally less likely to want to extend land reform policies to assist those who lost land under colonialism, farmworkers, squatters and women. They are significantly more less inclusive when it comes to generous land reform policies. However, there is no meaningful difference between claimants and those who missed the cut-off in some way in terms of radical land policy, except that claimants are more likely to advocate for more land to be given to productive users. This one measure is the least clear in terms of its indication of radical land policy preferences. Thus, those who have undergone the claimant process are distinctly less inclusive than those who have not, but there is little evidence that they assume more radical land policy positions from this test or the tests above. Thus, I find evidence in favour of the idea that victims of conflict are more altruistic in their political beliefs, as they clearly desire a more inclusive and expansive project than the average citizen. However, their co-victims who are in a formal claims process are more exclusive, but no more radical.

Figure 3: Political Attitudes by Claimant Status, Base=Eligible Non-Claimants




Table 6: Claimant Category vs Eligible Non Claimants on Land Policy

	Apartheid	Colonial	Farmworkers	Squatting I	Squatting	Gender	TAs	Producers	Tax All	Tax Whites	Force	Expropriate
[1em] Ineligible	0.0938 (0.0749)	0.00939 (0.0825)	-0.0261 (0.0869)	-0.224** (0.112)	-0.172 (0.106)	0.0384 (0.0799)	0.00767 (0.0938)	0.200 (0.129)	-0.290** (0.113)	-0.328** (0.131)	-0.146 (0.101)	-0.0184 (0.102)
Claimant	-0.0284 (0.0931)	-0.268** (0.116)	-0.232** (0.110)	-0.286** (0.125)	-0.215* (0.125)	-0.267** (0.106)	-0.128 (0.126)	0.275* (0.154)	-0.174 (0.146)	-0.126 (0.159)	-0.190 (0.135)	-0.0561 (0.122)
Harmed by Apartheid	0.207*** (0.0445)	0.165*** (0.0550)	0.258*** (0.0606)	0.109 (0.0767)	0.145* (0.0769)	0.184*** (0.0585)	0.231*** (0.0750)	-0.239*** (0.0849)	-0.143 (0.0877)	0.218** (0.0882)	0.138* (0.0753)	0.387*** (0.0632)
Rural	0.102** (0.0427)	0.0228 (0.0498)	0.0364 (0.0547)	0.0698 (0.0659)	-0.0263 (0.0608)	-0.0145 (0.0513)	0.198*** (0.0640)	0.188*** (0.0696)	-0.0560 (0.0712)	0.0667 (0.0744)	0.152** (0.0653)	0.0830 (0.0608)
Poor	-0.0117 (0.0563)	0.00519 (0.0634)	-0.178*** (0.0651)	0.0731 (0.0817)	0.0547 (0.0773)	-0.0300 (0.0559)	-0.0538 (0.0827)	-0.0691 (0.0906)	0.0633 (0.0915)	-0.0779 (0.0917)	-0.00309 (0.0854)	0.0139 (0.0770)
Age Cat	-0.00192 (0.0106)	0.00475 (0.0124)	-0.000884 (0.0130)	-0.0139 (0.0157)	-0.0115 (0.0154)	0.0145 (0.0128)	-0.0117 (0.0163)	-0.00793 (0.0165)	0.00398 (0.0180)	-0.0202 (0.0184)	0.00165 (0.0161)	-0.00918 (0.0153)
Gender	-0.0131 (0.0420)	0.0131 (0.0492)	0.0999* (0.0538)	0.0729 (0.0649)	0.0359 (0.0613)	0.0820 (0.0520)	0.0248 (0.0625)	0.106 (0.0696)	0.125* (0.0710)	0.0803 (0.0735)	0.0740 (0.0645)	-0.0245 (0.0585)
educ	0.00269 (0.00979)	0.00572 (0.0112)	0.00393 (0.0115)	-0.0195 (0.0143)	-0.0211 (0.0143)	0.0346*** (0.0127)	0.0321** (0.0149)	0.00954 (0.0157)	0.0324** (0.0160)	-0.00353 (0.0163)	0.0225 (0.0141)	0.0144 (0.0137)
Constant	4.251*** (0.141)	4.123*** (0.161)	4.138*** (0.165)	2.606*** (0.206)	2.515*** (0.196)	3.849*** (0.157)	3.443*** (0.205)	3.370*** (0.229)	3.195*** (0.220)	3.695*** (0.231)	3.701*** (0.194)	3.762*** (0.191)
Observations	1443	1444	1438	1434	1426	1425	1423	1427	1420	1427	1434	1430
R-squared	0.021	0.017	0.025	0.012	0.010	0.028	0.023	0.021	0.016	0.016	0.012	0.029

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

7 Discussion

This analysis reveals two notable findings. First, on the political activity hypotheses, land restitution claimants are more likely to participate in a multitude of land related activism compared to the general population, but they are no more likely to engage in various civic activities through group membership. In contrast, general victims of apartheid are no more likely to undertake land activism, but more likely to be members of a range of influential groups.

I argue that these divergent forms of political participation stem from the fact that contemporary political institutions mediate the long-run effects of victimization. People in the land claimant process must mobilize their resources to overcome onerous burdens placed on them to access restorative justice. These involve struggles against the people who dispossessed the community, the legal system, the state bureaucracy and other members of the community. Land activism is more pronounced than claimants' engagement with more formal civil society institutions that do not relate to land claims. While claimants are more likely to undertake land occupations, protests, complaints and petitions, they are no more likely to be members of key groups that might help their claims. In contrast, victims of apartheid are more likely to be members of important political groups, like parties and unions, but no more likely to engage in land activism when compared to other Black South Africans. In the appendix in Table [27](#), I find further support for the informalization of political participation in the finding that land claimants are much less likely to believe that land reform should "follow the law".

Thus, my findings reflect those made by [Hern \(2019\)](#). When claimants receive uneven or slow service, they must participate in political activity to ensure the completion of that service. However, I find that there is no observable spillover effect to other forms of participation, such as civil society work outside of land claims.

Second, while land claimants may be engaged in explicit land activism, they do not have more or less radical views of land reform. In contrast, victims of the unjust apartheid state

do have more radical views on land reform. These victims believe that land reform in South Africa should be much more expropriative and oriented towards questions of social justice. While these results do not mean that land reform claimants want land reform to be less radical, it is still noteworthy that movement for more radical policies stems from more deep-seated historical experience and not contemporary experience with land reform. This finding is in part in line with the findings in [Gibson \(2010\)](#), which show that land policy attitudes are often longheld beliefs. Further, the finding could stem from the fact that without being in the land claims process, victims of apartheid are left to engage with the equally frustrating but difficult to access land redistribution program, which could prompt them to demand greater land redistribution in the form of expropriation, compulsory acquisition and taxes on white South Africans.

I do find that land claimants have consistently more exclusive views about who should benefit from land reform. Instead of observing that land claimants choose to take a stand for broader societal transformation, my results show that land claimants are less likely to want to extend land reform to other groups in society, while those who suffered under the apartheid regime are more likely to want to extend these benefits. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these victims of apartheid who are not in the formal claims process are much keener than the broader population (and even relative to land claimants) to advocate for including more people into generous land reform policies and push for faster land reform through policy change. Such policy changes would, most likely, benefit non-claimant victims of apartheid who must rely on the redistribution program, which has many flaws ([Kepe and Hall, 2018](#)). Potentially, some land claimants may see the inclusion of others as using up scarce resources. If one is in a claims process that already seems underfunded, the inclusion of further people into the claims process may actually have an effect on your ability to get land, time in front of a court or funding to develop your land.

Importantly, my findings do not mean that land claimants had overtly exclusive attitudes. Rather, most of the key variables in the sample have a relatively high approval rating on the

1-5 scale (Table 9). Given that means for most of the land policy questions were over 3.5 and effect sizes for claimants generally never went above 0.3, one can see that on average land claimants were still in favour of these policies. However, claimants had significantly more exclusive views on many land issues in terms of inclusion and this difference is worth noting. While the differences created by the restitution program may not lead to groups opposed to equal land reform, it does lead many to be less in favour of it.

Several alternative mechanisms beyond experience with the land restitution process could drive this association and in the appendix I conduct further tests to show that the effects of land claimant status and victim status hold through a series of further tests. First, the effects of claimant status could stem from the feelings of those who missed out on the land claims process. In the appendix in Tables 10 to 12, I show that when one changes the reference category into a binary variable with claimants versus all non-claimants, these effects hold.

In terms of victim status, my findings may stem from contemporary institutions. Ineligible victims still feel dispossessed, but they must contend with the land redistribution program which is itself a difficult, long and incomprehensible bureaucratic practice (Kepe and Hall, 2016). Thus, they may seek the broader benefits that those in the restitution program have. However, even if this alternative explanation is true, then it is in itself an interesting finding. Further, it does not fundamentally undermine the above conclusions. Instead, it shows that the largest push for more radical and inclusive policy comes from those left out of the policy rather than from within. This finding would fit neatly within a theory that argues that poor service delivery may inspire activism around that delivery (Hern, 2019, 2017b,a). However, this interpretation would signify that those excluded from the process have much more pro-social views than those who are included, but not well served.

A second alternative explanation for the results is claimants select into the restitution process. In other words, those who made restitution claims could have been predisposed to more conservative beliefs. As Table 3 in the appendix shows, claimants are often more educated, urban and older, but no wealthier. One could imagine that urban status, age and

education could be correlated with different views over land reform and different capacities for collective action. Thus, I control for the above concerns in the regressions above. I control for a further set of post-treatment or balanced characteristics in the appendix in Tables [13](#), [14](#) and [15](#). I control for proximity to a traditional authority and knowledge of land claims processes. While traditional authority proximity is balanced across claimants and eligible non-claimants, traditional authorities may facilitate land claims in South Africa and elsewhere on the continent [Honig \(2017\)](#); [Baldwin \(2015\)](#); [McIntosh et al. \(1996\)](#); [Mathis \(2007\)](#).

A third alternative explanation could be driving these results for which I cannot account. That is, land restitution beneficiaries may have had such a negative experience with the program that they do not wish the experience on any of their compatriots and comrades seeking land. Thus, the findings may actually be other-regarding. Still, this alternative pathway does not change the findings substantively. It still shows the serious ramifications of poorly planned and onerous policies that leave the supposed beneficiaries disillusioned with the state's halfhearted attempt to provide them with justice.

8 Conclusion: Lessons for Redistribution and Restorative Justice

If a citizen of a country signs up to a program to restore their lost land or receive another form of compensation for past wrongs, harms or violations of their rights, they might expect their claim to be done quickly. This was the case in South Africa, where the government pledged to restore and redistribute 30% of white-owned land within five years. But 10 years into the process (at the time of the survey in the analysis above), it had only done around one per cent. Unsurprisingly, the analysis above find that these delays have had an effect on the people who hoped to engage the restitution process to achieve justice.

As one South African Land Claims lawyer emphasized to the author in 2019, there are

serious questions over the ability of the land restitution program to deliver justice. The lawyer argued that 10% of all landless peoples would get land in a “perfect world” where all restitution claimants got their land. Thus, if one relied on the land restitution program, it would be “impossible to satisfy land hunger” as land restitution is “not designed to satisfy the economic and social problems of land hunger” given the constraints on the program.²² Others, like Ngcukaitobi (2021) argue that land restitution is an expensive distraction from societal justice and that the generalized land redistribution process should take precedence.

Lu (2017) argues that transitional justice often does not address the root cause of injustice and focuses instead on reconciling the groups and bandaging up their respective wounds. Such justice leaves many problems within society, often relating directly to the issues that transitional justice tried to resolve. Land restitution or similar selective and generous but onerous compensatory mechanisms may not merely fail to meet society’s full demand for justice; they may also fail to meet the demands for justice from the intended beneficiaries. In these situations, intended beneficiaries may be left more disillusioned and exhausted by the process of achieving compensation for past injustices. This is not to say that restorative justice is not worth pursuing due to potential unintended consequences due to delays. Instead, policy makers must be cognizant of the burdens they place on the very people they aim to assist.

My findings offer up an additional problem presented by South Africa’s land restitution program on the scope of the benefits of restorative justice: selective restorative justice programs may actually have adverse effects on participants. While many studies have examined the surprisingly and counterintuitively positive effects in terms of political activity and altruistic attitudes from past repression and abuses, I argue that current institutional experiences can help explain these people’s political activity and attitudes. In this paper, I have examined the effects of participation in a program of restorative justice on political attitudes around redistribution and inclusion. Experience with this slow and onerous pro-

²²Interview with Lawyer II, October, 2019. Gauteng.

gram led people to advocate for themselves, but not for others. This side effect, I argue, stems from the lack of a clear, easy and quick process to achieve justice. Instead of feeling empowered, those who undertake a difficult and lengthy process that consumes resources and fails to deliver may actually distrust the state or not wish for others to go through that process.

Few—if any—proponents of programs to address historical injustices want to exclude other broader claims to redistributive justice. However, the findings above reveal that there may be serious unintended consequences to even well-meaning programs. While they may mobilize claimants to pursue justice for their own causes, such programs may also demobilize claimants in a different way. Select benefits signal to the public that justice has been served. However, those who have supposedly received these benefits may take on less inclusive and less demanding positions on adjacent social issues.

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9 Appendix

9.1 Survey Questions

Table 7: Survey Questions in the Dependent Variable

Activism Participation	Land Policy Attitudes
[What forms] of political action that people can take when it comes to land issues [have you done]?	[How should] land disputes in South Africa...be addressed?
Illegally occupy the land of another in order to live on the land	Returning land to those who had it taken away from them during apartheid.
Join in a protest over some land issues.	Returning land to those who had it taken away from them by the original White settlers in South Africa.
Complain to a government representative about some land issue.	Giving farm workers rights of ownership to the houses in which they are currently living.
Sign a petition about some land issue.	Preventing squatting by strictly enforcing the law.
Join in a boycott about some land issue.	Providing more protection to land owners against squatters.
Being involved in an eviction.	Requiring that any policy about land and land claims treat men and women equally.
Refusing to pay rates or levies in connection with some land issue.	Forcing tribal leaders to give each tribal member individual legal ownership of specific plots of land.
	Giving land only to those who know how to use it productively.
	Increasing taxes on everyone to pay for distribution of land to the poor.
	Taxing White property owners at a higher rate than Black property owners.
	Forcing large land owners to sell some of their property to the government so that it can be given to landless people.
	Taking land from those who unfairly got property in the past.
At the moment, there are many different factors that might influence land policy in South Africa. [What is most important] to making up for land injustices in the past?	
Making certain that land reform strictly follows the law.	Making certain that the hardest workers get the greatest amount of land.
	Making certain that those who suffered most under apartheid get the greatest amount of land.
	Making certain that unequal access to land is reduced.
	Making up for land injustices in the past.
	44 Making certain that those who acquired land unfairly under apartheid do not get to keep it.

9.2 Descriptive Statistics

Table 8: Descriptive Statistics, EVs

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Obs
Claimant	0.14	0.35	0	1	1522
Harmed by Apartheid	0.29	0.45	0	1	1549
Rural	0.40	0.49	0	1	1549
Poor	0.80	0.40	0	1	1544
Age Cat	4.12	2.55	1	11	1549
Gender	0.52	0.50	0	1	1549
educ	7.41	2.65	1	10	1454
Knowledge of the Land Claims Process	2.87	1.41	1	5	1520

9.3 Robustness Checks

Below I present a series of robustness checks that analyze different configurations of the explanatory variables and add different controls. No adjustment affects the findings in the main analyses.

Table 9: Descriptive Statistics, DVs

	(1)				
	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Obs
Occupy Land	0.05	0.22	0	1	1473
Land Protest	0.06	0.24	0	1	1485
Complaint	0.07	0.26	0	1	1482
Petition	0.06	0.24	0	1	1460
Boycott	0.06	0.24	0	1	1482
Refuse to pay	0.05	0.21	0	1	1448
Address Apartheid Dispossession	4.38	0.81	1	5	1542
Address Colonial Dispossession	4.21	0.89	1	5	1543
Give Farmworkers their Land	4.07	0.99	1	5	1536
Allow Squatting	2.38	1.12	1	5	1530
Force Landowners to Sell	3.84	1.13	1	5	1530
Tax Whites to pay for Land Reform	3.37	1.26	1	5	1521
Take Unjustly Acquired Land	3.95	1.03	1	5	1524
Only Give Land to Productive Farmers	3.60	1.22	1	5	1524
Force TAs to Give up Land	3.73	1.10	1	5	1519
Equal Treatment of Men and Women	4.19	0.89	1	5	1521
Tax all to pay for Land Reform	3.20	1.24	1	5	1514
Lessen Squatting Protection	2.29	1.03	1	5	1522
Past Injustices	3.83	1.25	1	5	1518
Reduce Land Inequality	3.87	1.22	1	5	1523
Give to Hard Workers	3.43	1.40	1	5	1506
Follow the Law	4.02	1.12	1	5	1532
Give to those who suffer most	3.56	1.38	1	5	1520
Target Unfairness	3.67	1.30	1	5	1508

9.4 Binary Claimant Status

Table 10: Claimant and Harm on Activity, Binary Claimant Status

	Occupation	Protest	Complaint	Petition	Boycott	Levy Strike
[1em] Claimant	0.0896*** (0.0257)	0.0752*** (0.0244)	0.120*** (0.0311)	0.0365 (0.0225)	0.0343 (0.0226)	0.0408* (0.0220)
Harmed by Apartheid	0.00819 (0.0145)	0.00875 (0.0172)	0.0323 (0.0205)	0.0192 (0.0179)	0.0129 (0.0168)	0.0407** (0.0172)
Rural	0.00503 (0.0117)	-0.0198* (0.0120)	-0.0227 (0.0144)	-0.0128 (0.0135)	-0.0222* (0.0125)	-0.0345*** (0.0114)
Poor	-0.0138 (0.0150)	0.0170 (0.0138)	0.0102 (0.0171)	-0.00997 (0.0179)	0.00762 (0.0142)	-0.0186 (0.0161)
Age Cat	-0.00538** (0.00264)	-0.000300 (0.00348)	-0.00140 (0.00408)	-0.00149 (0.00374)	-0.00116 (0.00333)	-0.00284 (0.00289)
Gender	-0.00555 (0.0115)	-0.00824 (0.0124)	-0.0217 (0.0138)	-0.0143 (0.0131)	-0.00783 (0.0120)	-0.0104 (0.0113)
educ	-0.00153 (0.00274)	-0.00161 (0.00348)	-0.00145 (0.00392)	0.00133 (0.00339)	-0.00159 (0.00331)	-0.00314 (0.00252)
Knowledge	0.000353 (0.00438)	0.00289 (0.00450)	0.00934* (0.00487)	0.00670 (0.00506)	0.000986 (0.00451)	0.00622 (0.00442)
Constant	0.0706** (0.0352)	0.0455 (0.0385)	0.0452 (0.0477)	0.0434 (0.0424)	0.0651 (0.0406)	0.0792** (0.0351)
Observations	1334	1343	1340	1320	1339	1312
R-squared	0.027	0.021	0.048	0.012	0.008	0.030

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table 11: Claimant and Harm on Group Membership, Binary Claimant Status

	Religious	Labour	Political Party	Community Action	Youth Group	Women's Group	Business Group	Farm Group	Rate Payers Group
[1em] Claimant	-0.0225 (0.0417)	-0.00536 (0.0198)	0.0152 (0.0332)	0.0169 (0.0171)	0.0504* (0.0281)	-0.00259 (0.0203)	-0.0100 (0.0123)	-0.0101* (0.00589)	0.00634 (0.0102)
Harmed by Apartheid	-0.0148 (0.0331)	0.0280* (0.0160)	0.0715*** (0.0251)	0.0178 (0.0130)	-0.0124 (0.0185)	0.000116 (0.0177)	0.0354** (0.0143)	0.0136* (0.00716)	0.0118 (0.00783)
Rural	0.0223 (0.0280)	-0.0419*** (0.0108)	-0.0349* (0.0184)	-0.00926 (0.00956)	-0.000238 (0.0184)	-0.0146 (0.0136)	0.00493 (0.00858)	0.0144** (0.00583)	-0.0113*** (0.00378)
Poor	-0.0760** (0.0351)	-0.0594*** (0.0204)	-0.0242 (0.0246)	-0.0235* (0.0141)	-0.0360 (0.0256)	-0.0189 (0.0173)	-0.0157 (0.0128)	-0.0107 (0.00797)	-0.00911 (0.00798)
Age Cat	0.0216*** (0.00681)	0.0102*** (0.00282)	0.00609 (0.00457)	0.00575** (0.00275)	-0.0260*** (0.00397)	0.0155*** (0.00379)	0.00463* (0.00252)	0.00542** (0.00217)	0.00112 (0.00133)
Gender	0.229*** (0.0280)	-0.0428*** (0.0117)	-0.0610*** (0.0190)	-0.0240** (0.00977)	-0.0307* (0.0180)	0.111*** (0.0127)	-0.0171** (0.00855)	-0.00452 (0.00523)	-0.0130*** (0.00398)
educ	0.0127** (0.00641)	0.0103*** (0.00284)	-0.0000584 (0.00472)	0.00315 (0.00259)	0.00669* (0.00352)	-0.00193 (0.00360)	0.00680*** (0.00217)	0.00241 (0.00170)	0.00157* (0.000855)
Knowledge	0.00367 (0.0103)	-0.00280 (0.00423)	0.0344*** (0.00719)	0.00448 (0.00349)	0.00535 (0.00669)	0.00991** (0.00443)	0.00195 (0.00302)	0.00244* (0.00139)	0.00200 (0.00178)
Constant	0.359*** (0.0828)	0.0200 (0.0334)	0.0576 (0.0558)	0.00187 (0.0300)	0.180*** (0.0534)	-0.0477 (0.0427)	-0.0421 (0.0264)	-0.0358* (0.0202)	0.000981 (0.0112)
Observations	1397	1397	1397	1397	1397	1397	1397	1397	1397
R-squared	0.072	0.064	0.058	0.023	0.074	0.094	0.031	0.033	0.026

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table 12: Claimant and Harm on Land Policy, Binary Claimant Status

	Apartheid	Colonial	Farmworkers	Squatting I	Squatting	Gender	TAs	Producers	Tax All	Tax Whites	Force	Expropriate
[lem] Claimant	-0.139** (0.0643)	-0.261*** (0.0919)	-0.202** (0.0793)	-0.0671 (0.0828)	-0.0705 (0.0860)	-0.320*** (0.0823)	-0.142 (0.101)	0.121 (0.104)	0.0875 (0.116)	0.206* (0.109)	-0.0549 (0.105)	-0.0379 (0.0815)
Harmed by Apartheid	0.196*** (0.0453)	0.173*** (0.0568)	0.263*** (0.0611)	0.119 (0.0782)	0.136* (0.0779)	0.197*** (0.0579)	0.251*** (0.0768)	-0.222** (0.0866)	-0.139 (0.0904)	0.200** (0.0910)	0.140* (0.0776)	0.384*** (0.0653)
Rural	0.115*** (0.0425)	0.0314 (0.0498)	0.0642 (0.0550)	0.0519 (0.0670)	-0.0526 (0.0618)	0.0172 (0.0518)	0.221*** (0.0654)	0.207*** (0.0704)	-0.0474 (0.0732)	0.0785 (0.0759)	0.143** (0.0669)	0.0767 (0.0614)
Poor	-0.0148 (0.0568)	-0.0160 (0.0629)	-0.148** (0.0664)	0.0957 (0.0829)	0.0674 (0.0778)	-0.0328 (0.0553)	-0.0509 (0.0841)	-0.0644 (0.0911)	0.0797 (0.0937)	-0.101 (0.0945)	-0.0260 (0.0867)	-0.0115 (0.0768)
Age Cat	-0.00802 (0.0109)	0.00628 (0.0126)	-0.00389 (0.0134)	-0.00642 (0.0161)	-0.00596 (0.0156)	0.0102 (0.0131)	-0.0152 (0.0165)	-0.0124 (0.0167)	0.00730 (0.0186)	-0.0141 (0.0189)	-0.0000402 (0.0164)	-0.0135 (0.0154)
Gender	0.0146 (0.0419)	0.0218 (0.0497)	0.121** (0.0546)	0.0735 (0.0660)	0.0263 (0.0627)	0.0830 (0.0529)	0.0353 (0.0640)	0.108 (0.0707)	0.136* (0.0730)	0.0793 (0.0749)	0.0833 (0.0663)	-0.00846 (0.0594)
educ	0.00201 (0.00979)	0.0108 (0.0115)	0.00704 (0.0119)	-0.0206 (0.0147)	-0.0243* (0.0146)	0.0354*** (0.0128)	0.0339** (0.0155)	0.0164 (0.0163)	0.0361** (0.0166)	-0.00166 (0.0168)	0.0225 (0.0144)	0.0120 (0.0140)
Knowledge	0.0364** (0.0150)	-0.00308 (0.0184)	0.0109 (0.0201)	-0.0448* (0.0255)	-0.00938 (0.0224)	0.0211 (0.0186)	-0.00269 (0.0234)	-0.0253 (0.0254)	0.0165 (0.0277)	-0.0258 (0.0282)	0.00862 (0.0239)	0.00571 (0.0213)
Constant	4.262*** (0.135)	4.106*** (0.151)	4.033*** (0.157)	2.507*** (0.187)	2.403*** (0.180)	3.833*** (0.151)	3.450*** (0.198)	3.581*** (0.207)	2.816*** (0.217)	3.454*** (0.222)	3.580*** (0.190)	3.796*** (0.182)
Observations	1391	1393	1391	1384	1376	1374	1375	1379	1370	1377	1385	1379
R-squared	0.027	0.017	0.026	0.012	0.009	0.033	0.028	0.023	0.012	0.011	0.010	0.028

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

9.4.1 Added Controls

Table 13: Claimant and Harm on Activity, Added Controls

	Occupation	Protest	Complaint	Petition	Boycott	Levy Strike
[1em] Ineligible	0.00471 (0.0152)	-0.00832 (0.0237)	0.00436 (0.0194)	0.0248 (0.0157)	-0.0241 (0.0225)	-0.00290 (0.0165)
Clamaint	0.0964*** (0.0289)	0.0713** (0.0343)	0.130*** (0.0368)	0.0669** (0.0274)	0.0270 (0.0329)	0.0525* (0.0276)
Harmed by Apartheid	0.0137 (0.0158)	0.0111 (0.0167)	0.0270 (0.0201)	0.0225 (0.0174)	0.00665 (0.0169)	0.0373** (0.0162)
Rural	-0.00181 (0.0181)	-0.00282 (0.0161)	-0.0145 (0.0146)	-0.0118 (0.0164)	-0.0272* (0.0158)	-0.0243* (0.0137)
Poor	-0.00787 (0.0148)	0.0223* (0.0135)	0.0135 (0.0173)	-0.0124 (0.0185)	0.0103 (0.0147)	-0.00497 (0.0138)
Age Cat	-0.00398 (0.00269)	0.00119 (0.00350)	-0.00153 (0.00442)	-0.0000927 (0.00403)	-0.00207 (0.00348)	-0.0000585 (0.00266)
Gender	-0.00678 (0.0119)	-0.00460 (0.0124)	-0.0198 (0.0142)	-0.0109 (0.0130)	-0.00882 (0.0124)	-0.00654 (0.0107)
educ	-0.0000658 (0.00280)	0.000274 (0.00356)	-0.00145 (0.00406)	0.00183 (0.00343)	-0.000840 (0.00325)	-0.00185 (0.00242)
Close to TA	0.00804 (0.0193)	-0.0329* (0.0170)	-0.0205 (0.0149)	-0.0184 (0.0163)	0.00647 (0.0160)	-0.0172 (0.0132)
Land Knowledge	-0.00889 (0.00609)	-0.00605 (0.00710)	0.00949 (0.00847)	-0.00102 (0.00758)	0.000115 (0.00770)	-0.00430 (0.00613)
Constant	0.0552 (0.0374)	0.0446 (0.0435)	0.0620 (0.0533)	0.0387 (0.0467)	0.0869* (0.0454)	0.0690* (0.0359)
Observations	1297	1305	1296	1282	1301	1277
R-squared	0.028	0.025	0.046	0.014	0.011	0.031

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table 14: Claimant and Harm on Group Membership, Added Controls

	Religious	Labour	Political Party	Community Action	Youth Group	Women's Group	Business Group	Farm Group	Rate Payers Group
[lem] Ineligible	-0.0599 (0.0427)	0.00736 (0.0183)	0.0125 (0.0308)	-0.0129 (0.0169)	-0.0973*** (0.0331)	-0.0103 (0.0267)	0.00398 (0.0164)	0.0141*** (0.00510)	-0.00353 (0.00697)
Clamaint	-0.0830 (0.0543)	0.00437 (0.0253)	0.0424 (0.0418)	0.0112 (0.0224)	-0.0297 (0.0410)	-0.00919 (0.0322)	-0.00332 (0.0204)	0.00130 (0.00425)	0.00788 (0.0118)
Harmed by Apartheid	-0.0534 (0.0326)	0.0130 (0.0153)	0.0691*** (0.0255)	0.0158 (0.0130)	-0.0181 (0.0178)	-0.00199 (0.0183)	0.0257* (0.0131)	0.0120 (0.00764)	0.00525 (0.00489)
Rural	-0.0605 (0.0401)	-0.0364*** (0.0127)	-0.0339 (0.0260)	-0.0266 (0.0166)	-0.0130 (0.0250)	-0.0501** (0.0212)	0.0166 (0.0131)	0.00409 (0.00466)	-0.0118** (0.00540)
Poor	-0.0678** (0.0344)	-0.0592*** (0.0203)	-0.0303 (0.0248)	-0.0266* (0.0144)	-0.0400 (0.0254)	-0.0171 (0.0176)	-0.0118 (0.0125)	-0.0112 (0.00823)	-0.00311 (0.00522)
Age Cat	0.0192*** (0.00689)	0.0108*** (0.00286)	0.00492 (0.00470)	0.00641** (0.00288)	-0.0273*** (0.00414)	0.0155*** (0.00388)	0.00350 (0.00251)	0.00531** (0.00213)	0.00189** (0.000908)
Gender	0.227*** (0.0281)	-0.0497*** (0.0120)	-0.0680*** (0.0193)	-0.0263*** (0.00993)	-0.0370** (0.0181)	0.107*** (0.0124)	-0.0164* (0.00877)	-0.00504 (0.00542)	-0.0124*** (0.00392)
educ	0.00944 (0.00638)	0.00961*** (0.00271)	-0.00207 (0.00472)	0.00370 (0.00259)	0.00723** (0.00359)	-0.00179 (0.00361)	0.00516** (0.00203)	0.00192 (0.00154)	0.00157** (0.000793)
Close to TA	0.131*** (0.0402)	-0.00716 (0.0129)	0.00786 (0.00786)	0.0195 (0.0163)	0.0143 (0.0244)	0.0514** (0.0217)	-0.0115 (0.0128)	0.0162*** (0.00355)	0.00385 (0.00601)
Land Knowledge	0.0377*** (0.0144)	0.00817 (0.00544)	0.0404*** (0.0105)	-0.000680 (0.00502)	0.0187* (0.00971)	0.0132* (0.00767)	0.0177*** (0.00522)	0.00676* (0.00355)	0.00260 (0.00168)
Constant	0.423*** (0.0860)	0.00878 (0.0358)	0.127** (0.0573)	0.0243 (0.0312)	0.272*** (0.0590)	-0.0289 (0.0503)	-0.0436 (0.0325)	-0.0444** (0.0225)	-0.00194 (0.00791)
Observations	1356	1356	1356	1356	1356	1356	1356	1356	1356
R-squared	0.087	0.069	0.050	0.026	0.088	0.098	0.041	0.042	0.023

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table 15: Claimant and Harm on Land Policy, Added Controls

	Apartheid	Colonial	Farmworkers	Squatting I	Squatting	Gender	TAs	Producers	Tax All	Tax Whites	Force	Expropriate
[lem] Ineligible	0.0834 (0.0775)	-0.0189 (0.0847)	-0.0104 (0.0886)	-0.228** (0.116)	-0.129 (0.109)	0.0255 (0.0826)	-0.00354 (0.0965)	0.192 (0.133)	-0.347*** (0.116)	-0.354*** (0.135)	-0.148 (0.102)	-0.0260 (0.106)
Clamaint	-0.0649 (0.0970)	-0.359*** (0.120)	-0.242** (0.111)	-0.310** (0.131)	-0.206 (0.128)	-0.318*** (0.111)	-0.153 (0.133)	0.230 (0.161)	-0.230 (0.147)	-0.171 (0.163)	-0.246* (0.137)	-0.108 (0.126)
Harmed by Apartheid	0.208*** (0.0469)	0.142** (0.0571)	0.255*** (0.0629)	0.118 (0.0786)	0.157** (0.0796)	0.182*** (0.0595)	0.253*** (0.0772)	-0.238*** (0.0874)	-0.143 (0.0898)	0.226** (0.0909)	0.111 (0.0768)	0.373*** (0.0654)
Rural	0.0651 (0.0598)	-0.00456 (0.0666)	-0.00561 (0.0734)	0.0825 (0.0918)	0.0874 (0.0852)	-0.0789 (0.0700)	0.222** (0.0941)	0.213** (0.0966)	-0.285*** (0.105)	0.0887 (0.103)	0.0442 (0.0951)	0.0514 (0.0827)
Poor	-0.0361 (0.0589)	-0.0172 (0.0650)	-0.196*** (0.0671)	0.0780 (0.0845)	0.0728 (0.0804)	-0.0871 (0.0562)	-0.0762 (0.0857)	-0.0749 (0.0938)	-0.00332 (0.0939)	-0.105 (0.0951)	-0.0622 (0.0874)	-0.0167 (0.0791)
Age Cat	-0.00392 (0.0110)	-0.00105 (0.0129)	-0.0141 (0.0133)	-0.00867 (0.0166)	-0.00723 (0.0162)	0.00692 (0.0136)	-0.0192 (0.0166)	-0.0105 (0.0175)	-0.00388 (0.0184)	-0.0235 (0.0191)	-0.0165 (0.0167)	-0.0190 (0.0159)
Gender	0.00376 (0.0436)	0.0209 (0.0507)	0.119** (0.0550)	0.0741 (0.0670)	0.0472 (0.0638)	0.0776 (0.0537)	0.0321 (0.0645)	0.110 (0.0720)	0.122* (0.0730)	0.0858 (0.0756)	0.0836 (0.0666)	-0.000157 (0.0601)
educ	-0.000841 (0.0100)	-0.00254 (0.0116)	-0.00263 (0.0120)	-0.0220 (0.0151)	-0.0180 (0.0149)	0.0301** (0.0136)	0.0278* (0.0155)	0.00922 (0.0165)	0.0265 (0.0162)	-0.00673 (0.0169)	0.00970 (0.0148)	0.00528 (0.0143)
Close to TA	0.0562 (0.0599)	0.0752 (0.0685)	0.0594 (0.0736)	-0.0172 (0.0924)	-0.146* (0.0873)	0.0955 (0.0724)	-0.0572 (0.0951)	-0.0457 (0.0979)	0.287*** (0.107)	-0.0790 (0.105)	0.115 (0.0955)	0.0808 (0.0840)
Land Knowledge	0.0187 (0.0239)	0.0762*** (0.0265)	0.0414 (0.0289)	-0.00909 (0.0344)	0.00166 (0.0329)	0.0312 (0.0284)	0.00816 (0.0331)	-0.00148 (0.0378)	-0.0371 (0.0365)	-0.0169 (0.0397)	0.0686* (0.0360)	0.0850*** (0.0309)
Constant	4.280*** (0.147)	4.168*** (0.167)	4.197*** (0.169)	2.605*** (0.213)	2.420*** (0.203)	3.935*** (0.162)	3.536*** (0.211)	3.404*** (0.238)	3.396*** (0.222)	3.830*** (0.239)	3.867*** (0.198)	3.787*** (0.197)
Observations	1349	1350	1345	1343	1332	1335	1331	1336	1329	1335	1341	1337
R-squared	0.025	0.029	0.030	0.015	0.013	0.035	0.025	0.022	0.025	0.018	0.015	0.038

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

9.4.2 Continuous Harm Variable

Table 16: Claimant and Harm on Activity, Continuous Harm Variable

	Occupation	Protest	Complaint	Petition	Boycott	Levy Strike
[1em] Ineligible	0.00158 (0.0150)	-0.0103 (0.0229)	-0.00367 (0.0194)	0.0230 (0.0154)	-0.0285 (0.0222)	0.000462 (0.0161)
Clamaint	0.0951*** (0.0282)	0.0684** (0.0329)	0.121*** (0.0360)	0.0577** (0.0257)	0.0224 (0.0314)	0.0485* (0.0265)
No. Crimes 0-1	-0.0100 (0.0274)	-0.00435 (0.0308)	0.0924** (0.0363)	0.0750** (0.0308)	0.0235 (0.0294)	0.0709** (0.0310)
Rural	0.00478 (0.0116)	-0.0211* (0.0120)	-0.0202 (0.0142)	-0.0140 (0.0131)	-0.0173 (0.0126)	-0.0308*** (0.0109)
Poor	-0.0148 (0.0151)	0.0182 (0.0135)	0.0109 (0.0167)	-0.00815 (0.0173)	0.0121 (0.0139)	-0.0175 (0.0156)
Age Cat	-0.00480* (0.00254)	0.000484 (0.00335)	-0.00275 (0.00403)	-0.00256 (0.00350)	-0.00206 (0.00327)	-0.00292 (0.00285)
Gender	-0.00890 (0.0120)	-0.00891 (0.0120)	-0.0160 (0.0136)	-0.00792 (0.0124)	-0.00863 (0.0118)	-0.00918 (0.0110)
educ	-0.00195 (0.00260)	-0.00107 (0.00329)	-0.00134 (0.00382)	0.00149 (0.00323)	-0.000577 (0.00312)	-0.00247 (0.00237)
Constant	0.0789** (0.0380)	0.0579 (0.0436)	0.0681 (0.0530)	0.0340 (0.0455)	0.0830* (0.0448)	0.0864** (0.0370)
Observations	1382	1392	1387	1367	1388	1358
R-squared	0.027	0.020	0.045	0.013	0.011	0.025

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table 17: Claimant and Harm on Group Membership, Continuous Harm Variable

	Religious	Labour	Political Party	Community Action	Youth Group	Women's Group	Business Group	Farm Group	Rate Payers Group
[1em] Ineligible	-0.0767* (0.0416)	0.0129 (0.0175)	-0.00101 (0.0307)	-0.00978 (0.0162)	-0.0924*** (0.0317)	-0.00730 (0.0257)	0.000436 (0.0159)	0.0140*** (0.00494)	-0.00190 (0.00666)
Clamaint	-0.0883* (0.0532)	0.00257 (0.0239)	0.0413 (0.0414)	0.0119 (0.0210)	-0.0275 (0.0392)	-0.00332 (0.0306)	-0.00560 (0.0194)	0.00548 (0.00429)	0.00760 (0.0115)
No. Crimes 0-1	-0.129* (0.0671)	0.0522 (0.0367)	0.188*** (0.0549)	0.0479* (0.0272)	-0.0501 (0.0319)	0.0460 (0.0388)	0.0676** (0.0266)	0.0206 (0.0172)	0.0117 (0.0133)
Rural	0.0163 (0.0273)	-0.0417*** (0.0103)	-0.0255 (0.0182)	-0.00721 (0.00954)	-0.00340 (0.0177)	-0.0128 (0.0133)	0.00767 (0.00792)	0.0149** (0.00597)	-0.0102*** (0.00343)
Poor	-0.0768** (0.0339)	-0.0587*** (0.0200)	-0.0249 (0.0238)	-0.0232* (0.0137)	-0.0360 (0.0246)	-0.0183 (0.0168)	-0.0163 (0.0123)	-0.0108 (0.00779)	-0.00883 (0.00768)
Age Cat	0.0227*** (0.00692)	0.0106*** (0.00315)	0.00557 (0.00500)	0.00503* (0.00302)	-0.0240*** (0.00406)	0.0144*** (0.00405)	0.00391 (0.00255)	0.00553** (0.00230)	0.00139 (0.00105)
Gender	0.218*** (0.0279)	-0.0429*** (0.0117)	-0.0623*** (0.0185)	-0.0226** (0.00941)	-0.0376** (0.0176)	0.108*** (0.0124)	-0.0148* (0.00829)	-0.00432 (0.00528)	-0.0133*** (0.00431)
educ	0.0107* (0.00622)	0.0104*** (0.00275)	0.00165 (0.00458)	0.00350 (0.00248)	0.00755** (0.00337)	-0.000872 (0.00334)	0.00671*** (0.00209)	0.00232 (0.00162)	0.00163* (0.000844)
Constant	0.478*** (0.0846)	-0.00181 (0.0352)	0.125** (0.0560)	0.0172 (0.0294)	0.269*** (0.0564)	-0.0262 (0.0483)	-0.0381 (0.0306)	-0.0414** (0.0210)	0.00706 (0.0125)
Observations	1450	1450	1450	1450	1450	1450	1450	1450	1450
R-squared	0.075	0.067	0.040	0.023	0.080	0.090	0.028	0.030	0.021

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table 18: Claimant and Harm on Land Policy, Continuous Harm Variable

	Apartheid	Colonial	Farmworkers	Squatting I	Squatting	Gender	TAs	Producers	Tax All	Tax Whites	Force	Expropriate
[lem] Ineligible	0.0961 (0.0754)	0.0107 (0.0833)	-0.0246 (0.0863)	-0.224** (0.112)	-0.175 (0.107)	0.0417 (0.0791)	0.0103 (0.0942)	0.200 (0.130)	-0.288** (0.113)	-0.331** (0.131)	-0.142 (0.1000)	-0.0145 (0.103)
Clamaint	-0.0176 (0.0940)	-0.256** (0.117)	-0.212* (0.109)	-0.272** (0.125)	-0.183 (0.124)	-0.269** (0.105)	-0.116 (0.125)	0.234 (0.154)	-0.200 (0.146)	-0.0882 (0.159)	-0.191 (0.134)	-0.0114 (0.123)
No. Crimes 0-1	0.466*** (0.0956)	0.321*** (0.112)	0.448*** (0.122)	0.134 (0.153)	-0.0944 (0.152)	0.592*** (0.119)	0.497*** (0.138)	-0.0570 (0.167)	-0.0124 (0.185)	0.0447 (0.180)	0.461*** (0.154)	0.504*** (0.157)
Rural	0.122*** (0.0423)	0.0379 (0.0498)	0.0584 (0.0544)	0.0781 (0.0661)	-0.0198 (0.0614)	0.00755 (0.0502)	0.220*** (0.0641)	0.175** (0.0701)	-0.0643 (0.0715)	0.0792 (0.0748)	0.168*** (0.0651)	0.113* (0.0613)
Poor	-0.0154 (0.0566)	0.00309 (0.0636)	-0.180*** (0.0648)	0.0731 (0.0818)	0.0588 (0.0776)	-0.0377 (0.0557)	-0.0567 (0.0820)	-0.0724 (0.0910)	0.0605 (0.0920)	-0.0743 (0.0915)	-0.00855 (0.0853)	0.0128 (0.0775)
Age Cat	-0.00878 (0.0112)	0.00128 (0.0131)	-0.00453 (0.0136)	-0.0133 (0.0165)	-0.000123 (0.0163)	0.00151 (0.0137)	-0.0187 (0.0170)	-0.0184 (0.0174)	-0.00296 (0.0190)	-0.0105 (0.0192)	-0.00881 (0.0170)	-0.00808 (0.0161)
Gender	0.00755 (0.0435)	0.0258 (0.0504)	0.116** (0.0549)	0.0757 (0.0654)	0.0191 (0.0620)	0.114** (0.0531)	0.0468 (0.0632)	0.118* (0.0703)	0.134* (0.0719)	0.0692 (0.0751)	0.0995 (0.0650)	-0.0121 (0.0609)
educ	0.00327 (0.00983)	0.00609 (0.0113)	0.00422 (0.0116)	-0.0195 (0.0143)	-0.0215 (0.0144)	0.0357*** (0.0126)	0.0326** (0.0148)	0.0102 (0.0159)	0.0327*** (0.0160)	-0.00425 (0.0163)	0.0231 (0.0141)	0.0144 (0.0137)
Constant	4.231*** (0.142)	4.111*** (0.162)	4.126*** (0.165)	2.605*** (0.206)	2.531*** (0.196)	3.819*** (0.157)	3.425*** (0.205)	3.356*** (0.231)	3.185*** (0.220)	3.711*** (0.233)	3.678*** (0.192)	3.753*** (0.193)
Observations	1443	1444	1438	1434	1426	1425	1423	1427	1420	1427	1434	1430
R-squared	0.024	0.016	0.021	0.011	0.007	0.039	0.024	0.015	0.013	0.011	0.016	0.013

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

9.4.3 Logistic Regressions

Table 19: Claimant and Harm on Activity, Logistic Regressions

	Occupation	Protest	Complaint	Petition	Boycott	Levy Strike
[lem] main Ineligible	0.113 (0.568)	-0.244 (0.482)	-0.0891 (0.384)	0.634 (0.523)	-0.548 (0.361)	-0.00707 (0.493)
Clamaint	1.566*** (0.591)	0.850* (0.511)	1.218*** (0.417)	1.148** (0.577)	0.237 (0.428)	0.756 (0.533)
Harmed by Apartheid	0.248 (0.325)	0.201 (0.299)	0.589** (0.268)	0.437 (0.294)	0.271 (0.295)	0.986*** (0.348)
Rural	0.0878 (0.284)	-0.453* (0.260)	-0.422* (0.246)	-0.343 (0.262)	-0.381 (0.262)	-0.957*** (0.332)
Poor	-0.341 (0.311)	0.412 (0.338)	0.199 (0.305)	-0.133 (0.305)	0.258 (0.314)	-0.402 (0.329)
Age Cat	-0.145** (0.0680)	-0.00326 (0.0718)	-0.0227 (0.0693)	-0.0227 (0.0749)	-0.0391 (0.0678)	-0.0729 (0.0780)
Gender	-0.174 (0.275)	-0.163 (0.247)	-0.345 (0.229)	-0.237 (0.244)	-0.187 (0.241)	-0.294 (0.282)
educ	-0.0466 (0.0611)	-0.0194 (0.0641)	-0.0248 (0.0594)	0.0271 (0.0644)	-0.0125 (0.0603)	-0.0705 (0.0536)
Constant	-2.417** (0.946)	-2.889*** (0.871)	-2.600*** (0.871)	-3.397*** (1.027)	-2.341*** (0.823)	-2.039** (0.875)
Observations	1382	1392	1387	1367	1388	1358
R-squared						

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table 20: Claimant and Harm on Group Membership, Logistic Regressions

	Religious	Labour	Political Party	Community Action	Youth Group	Women's Group	Business Group	Farm Group	Rate Payers Group
[1em] main									
Ineligible	-0.374* (0.208)	0.443 (0.553)	-0.0186 (0.284)	-0.361 (0.488)	-1.031*** (0.311)	0.0410 (0.410)	0.0288 (0.797)	1.430 (1.133)	-0.0770 (1.151)
Clamaint	-0.445* (0.254)	0.262 (0.657)	0.275 (0.332)	0.212 (0.523)	-0.277 (0.371)	0.111 (0.499)	-0.428 (0.971)		0.786 (1.222)
Harmed by Apartheid	-0.0967 (0.145)	0.398 (0.334)	0.722*** (0.184)	0.555 (0.350)	0.00271 (0.269)	0.212 (0.290)	1.591*** (0.507)	1.783** (0.870)	1.512* (0.878)
Rural	0.0918 (0.124)	-1.289*** (0.395)	-0.306* (0.173)	-0.298 (0.360)	-0.0961 (0.215)	-0.367 (0.271)	0.478 (0.397)	2.375*** (0.865)	
Poor	-0.367** (0.162)	-0.984*** (0.308)	-0.212 (0.201)	-0.643* (0.335)	-0.321 (0.239)	-0.215 (0.310)	-0.579 (0.439)	-1.325** (0.675)	-0.882 (0.708)
Age Cat	0.0865*** (0.0309)	0.267*** (0.0680)	0.0691* (0.0398)	0.187** (0.0858)	-0.438*** (0.0686)	0.315*** (0.0700)	0.228* (0.119)	0.727*** (0.181)	0.0949 (0.208)
Gender	0.986*** (0.123)	-1.169*** (0.309)	-0.642*** (0.172)	-0.884*** (0.338)	-0.389* (0.206)	4.247*** (1.018)	-0.976** (0.467)	-0.712 (0.817)	
educ	0.0490* (0.0281)	0.266*** (0.0878)	0.0104 (0.0398)	0.104 (0.0837)	0.198*** (0.0664)	0.00305 (0.0650)	0.408*** (0.143)	0.300* (0.165)	0.205 (0.130)
Constant	-0.0906 (0.389)	-5.230*** (1.115)	-1.935*** (0.504)	-4.039*** (1.050)	-1.320* (0.770)	-7.605*** (1.407)	-8.181*** (1.840)	-13.37*** (3.007)	-5.938*** (1.380)
Observations	1450	1450	1450	1450	1450	1450	1450	1300	415
R-squared									

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

9.4.4 Full Reference Category

Table 21: Claimant and Harm on Activity, All Forced Removals

	Occupation	Protest	Complaint	Petition	Boycott	Levy Strike
[1em] Ineligible	0.000858 (0.0121)	-0.00977 (0.0165)	0.00137 (0.0160)	0.0161 (0.0149)	-0.0128 (0.0150)	-0.00935 (0.0143)
Clamaint	0.0893*** (0.0263)	0.0694** (0.0280)	0.118*** (0.0333)	0.0462* (0.0245)	0.0242 (0.0254)	0.0361 (0.0246)
Harmed by Apartheid	0.0122 (0.0154)	0.00887 (0.0175)	0.0324 (0.0207)	0.0222 (0.0179)	0.0139 (0.0174)	0.0415** (0.0177)
Rural	0.000994 (0.0117)	-0.0211* (0.0118)	-0.0223 (0.0140)	-0.0170 (0.0134)	-0.0210* (0.0122)	-0.0349*** (0.0115)
Poor	-0.0128 (0.0148)	0.0170 (0.0136)	0.0120 (0.0169)	-0.00811 (0.0177)	0.00909 (0.0142)	-0.0188 (0.0158)
Age Cat	-0.00489* (0.00271)	0.000197 (0.00355)	-0.00199 (0.00431)	-0.000876 (0.00394)	-0.00105 (0.00335)	-0.00227 (0.00277)
Gender	-0.00310 (0.0113)	-0.00739 (0.0122)	-0.0183 (0.0137)	-0.0114 (0.0130)	-0.00851 (0.0119)	-0.0105 (0.0110)
educ	-0.00115 (0.00284)	-0.000851 (0.00355)	-0.00240 (0.00406)	0.00137 (0.00342)	-0.00119 (0.00328)	-0.00231 (0.00246)
Claims Knowledge	0.00186 (0.00440)	0.00323 (0.00434)	0.00848* (0.00480)	0.00817 (0.00501)	0.000722 (0.00449)	0.00654 (0.00436)
Land Knowledge	-0.00803 (0.00586)	-0.00617 (0.00673)	0.00716 (0.00843)	-0.00294 (0.00745)	0.000190 (0.00763)	-0.00785 (0.00627)
Constant	0.0680* (0.0380)	0.0500 (0.0429)	0.0467 (0.0519)	0.0263 (0.0450)	0.0708 (0.0433)	0.0840** (0.0378)
Observations	1358	1367	1364	1345	1364	1336
R-squared	0.027	0.022	0.047	0.013	0.009	0.032

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table 22: Claimant and Harm on Group Membership, All Forced Removals

	Religious	Labour	Political Party	Community Action	Youth Group	Women's Group	Business Group	Farm Group	Rate Payers Group
[lem] Ineligible	-0.000501 (0.0345)	0.00673 (0.0142)	-0.0250 (0.0254)	-0.00450 (0.0131)	-0.0549** (0.0228)	-0.00976 (0.0191)	-0.00928 (0.0122)	0.00938 (0.00734)	0.00125 (0.00531)
Clamaint	-0.0296 (0.0477)	-0.00159 (0.0218)	-0.00591 (0.0377)	0.0143 (0.0192)	0.0106 (0.0314)	-0.0102 (0.0250)	-0.0185 (0.0162)	-0.00407 (0.00669)	0.00728 (0.0106)
Harmed by Apartheid	-0.0259 (0.0332)	0.0260 (0.0160)	0.0627** (0.0252)	0.0175 (0.0134)	-0.0214 (0.0183)	-0.00562 (0.0181)	0.0291** (0.0130)	0.0124* (0.00728)	0.0118 (0.00820)
Rural	0.0311 (0.0277)	-0.0409*** (0.0106)	-0.0277 (0.0181)	-0.00914 (0.00938)	0.00314 (0.0182)	-0.0125 (0.0134)	0.00768 (0.00840)	0.0146** (0.00583)	-0.0111*** (0.00391)
Poor	-0.0684** (0.0345)	-0.0569*** (0.0201)	-0.0210 (0.0242)	-0.0234* (0.0138)	-0.0361 (0.0248)	-0.0174 (0.0169)	-0.0144 (0.0124)	-0.0102 (0.00776)	-0.00892 (0.00799)
Age Cat	0.0174** (0.00691)	0.0101*** (0.00271)	0.00363 (0.00460)	0.00584** (0.00278)	-0.0276*** (0.00408)	0.0148*** (0.00383)	0.00311 (0.00254)	0.00515** (0.00211)	0.00113 (0.00116)
Gender	0.231*** (0.0278)	-0.0422*** (0.0115)	-0.0609*** (0.0186)	-0.0237** (0.00962)	-0.0290 (0.0177)	0.110*** (0.0125)	-0.0169** (0.00830)	-0.00480 (0.00512)	-0.0130*** (0.00397)
educ	0.00988 (0.00641)	0.00988*** (0.00271)	-0.00207 (0.00464)	0.00335 (0.00254)	0.00597* (0.00356)	-0.00231 (0.00363)	0.00553*** (0.00203)	0.00192 (0.00152)	0.00155** (0.000775)
Claims Knowledge	0.000759 (0.0102)	-0.00301 (0.00432)	0.0309*** (0.00719)	0.00445 (0.00353)	0.00301 (0.00670)	0.00890** (0.00441)	0.000261 (0.00292)	0.00215 (0.00139)	0.00199 (0.00195)
Land Knowledge	0.0366** (0.0144)	0.00754 (0.00588)	0.0337*** (0.0104)	-0.00140 (0.00486)	0.0187** (0.00946)	0.0104 (0.00752)	0.0188*** (0.00514)	0.00596* (0.00344)	0.000248 (0.00271)
Constant	0.366*** (0.0854)	0.00953 (0.0331)	0.0742 (0.0585)	0.00436 (0.0300)	0.220*** (0.0553)	-0.0420 (0.0473)	-0.0340 (0.0292)	-0.0431* (0.0228)	-0.000355 (0.00999)
Observations	1422	1422	1422	1422	1422	1422	1422	1422	1422
R-squared	0.076	0.064	0.068	0.023	0.081	0.096	0.046	0.037	0.025

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table 23: Claimant and Harm on Land Policy, All Forced Removals

	Apartheid	Colonial	Farmworkers	Squatting I	Squatting	Gender	TAs	Producers	Tax All	Tax Whites	Force	Expropriate
[lem] Ineligible	-0.0268 (0.0540)	-0.00764 (0.0634)	-0.0495 (0.0672)	-0.136 (0.0876)	-0.110 (0.0806)	0.0564 (0.0621)	-0.0892 (0.0745)	-0.00291 (0.0957)	-0.206** (0.0919)	-0.326*** (0.0986)	-0.144* (0.0787)	-0.0357 (0.0769)
Clamaint	-0.153** (0.0757)	-0.279*** (0.103)	-0.236** (0.0919)	-0.167 (0.103)	-0.155 (0.0947)	-0.270*** (0.0947)	-0.191* (0.110)	0.127 (0.125)	-0.0557 (0.131)	-0.0271 (0.129)	-0.159 (0.117)	-0.0671 (0.0989)
Harmed by Apartheid	0.192*** (0.0464)	0.155*** (0.0569)	0.248*** (0.0621)	0.122 (0.0779)	0.133* (0.0784)	0.180*** (0.0585)	0.236*** (0.0774)	-0.220** (0.0864)	-0.139 (0.0904)	0.191** (0.0911)	0.113 (0.0777)	0.357*** (0.0657)
Rural	0.123*** (0.0426)	0.0604 (0.0495)	0.0678 (0.0551)	0.0449 (0.0663)	-0.0508 (0.0618)	0.00637 (0.0515)	0.222*** (0.0646)	0.202*** (0.0701)	-0.0451 (0.0724)	0.0999 (0.0751)	0.171** (0.0665)	0.104* (0.0613)
Poor	-0.0111 (0.0566)	0.0105 (0.0630)	-0.153** (0.0656)	0.0770 (0.0823)	0.0594 (0.0789)	-0.0279 (0.0552)	-0.0495 (0.0833)	-0.0662 (0.0906)	0.0650 (0.0922)	-0.102 (0.0928)	-0.00163 (0.0862)	0.0155 (0.0772)
Age Cat	-0.00788 (0.0106)	0.000464 (0.0125)	-0.00553 (0.0134)	-0.00992 (0.0164)	-0.0115 (0.0159)	0.0132 (0.0135)	-0.0125 (0.0166)	-0.00952 (0.0173)	0.00556 (0.0185)	-0.0206 (0.0188)	-0.00497 (0.0167)	-0.0176 (0.0157)
Gender	0.0141 (0.0419)	0.0128 (0.0494)	0.114** (0.0543)	0.0812 (0.0653)	0.0434 (0.0621)	0.0754 (0.0528)	0.0253 (0.0635)	0.0932 (0.0706)	0.133* (0.0721)	0.0808 (0.0743)	0.0760 (0.0657)	-0.0271 (0.0592)
educ	0.00156 (0.00956)	0.00617 (0.0114)	0.00423 (0.0119)	-0.0214 (0.0148)	-0.0251* (0.0147)	0.0363*** (0.0133)	0.0365** (0.0154)	0.0151 (0.0164)	0.0384** (0.0164)	-0.000936 (0.0167)	0.0190 (0.0147)	0.00827 (0.0141)
Claims Knowledge	0.0351** (0.0153)	-0.00422 (0.0185)	0.00425 (0.0201)	-0.0479* (0.0254)	-0.0130 (0.0226)	0.0199 (0.0187)	-0.00837 (0.0237)	-0.0247 (0.0257)	0.0134 (0.0276)	-0.0282 (0.0283)	0.000320 (0.0240)	0.00335 (0.0215)
Land Knowledge	0.0121 (0.0233)	0.0738*** (0.0259)	0.0389 (0.0283)	-0.0195 (0.0341)	0.00163 (0.0321)	0.0237 (0.0277)	-0.00237 (0.0330)	0.00112 (0.0372)	-0.0445 (0.0364)	-0.0224 (0.0388)	0.0635* (0.0358)	0.0756** (0.0305)
Constant	4.264*** (0.135)	4.078*** (0.158)	4.084*** (0.162)	2.676*** (0.201)	2.527*** (0.197)	3.750*** (0.161)	3.502*** (0.205)	3.577*** (0.227)	3.029*** (0.227)	3.743*** (0.234)	3.669*** (0.197)	3.775*** (0.195)
Observations	1416	1418	1416	1409	1401	1399	1400	1402	1395	1402	1409	1404
R-squared	0.028	0.024	0.027	0.015	0.011	0.031	0.027	0.021	0.016	0.021	0.016	0.034

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

9.4.5 Claimant Test Without Harm

Table 24: Claimant on Activity

	Occupation	Protest	Complaint	Petition	Boycott	Levy Strike
[1em] Ineligible	0.00168 (0.0150)	-0.0103 (0.0229)	-0.00450 (0.0197)	0.0224 (0.0155)	-0.0286 (0.0221)	0.000378 (0.0161)
Clamaint	0.0945*** (0.0280)	0.0682** (0.0330)	0.127*** (0.0357)	0.0625** (0.0256)	0.0238 (0.0315)	0.0533** (0.0263)
Rural	0.00498 (0.0116)	-0.0210* (0.0118)	-0.0222 (0.0141)	-0.0159 (0.0131)	-0.0177 (0.0126)	-0.0319*** (0.0108)
Poor	-0.0149 (0.0150)	0.0181 (0.0134)	0.0125 (0.0166)	-0.00693 (0.0174)	0.0125 (0.0139)	-0.0161 (0.0156)
Age Cat	-0.00519** (0.00244)	0.000317 (0.00317)	0.000768 (0.00393)	0.000284 (0.00347)	-0.00117 (0.00312)	-0.000138 (0.00256)
Gender	-0.00813 (0.0114)	-0.00858 (0.0122)	-0.0231* (0.0138)	-0.0136 (0.0128)	-0.0104 (0.0121)	-0.0145 (0.0110)
educ	-0.00194 (0.00260)	-0.00106 (0.00329)	-0.00151 (0.00381)	0.00136 (0.00323)	-0.000629 (0.00311)	-0.00255 (0.00238)
Constant	0.0782** (0.0378)	0.0576 (0.0434)	0.0748 (0.0530)	0.0394 (0.0455)	0.0846* (0.0446)	0.0900** (0.0371)
Observations	1382	1392	1387	1367	1388	1358
R-squared	0.027	0.020	0.039	0.009	0.010	0.020

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table 25: Claimant on Group Membership

	Religious	Labour	Political Party	Community Action	Youth Group	Women's Group	Business Group	Farm Group	Rate Payers Group
[1em] Ineligible	-0.0753* (0.0417)	0.0123 (0.0180)	-0.00304 (0.0313)	-0.0103 (0.0162)	-0.0919*** (0.0316)	-0.00780 (0.0257)	-0.000299 (0.0164)	0.0138*** (0.00488)	-0.00202 (0.00676)
Clamaint	-0.0955* (0.0532)	0.00550 (0.0234)	0.0518 (0.0416)	0.0145 (0.0212)	-0.0303 (0.0390)	-0.000749 (0.0309)	-0.00182 (0.0191)	0.00664 (0.00445)	0.00825 (0.0111)
Rural	0.0188 (0.0274)	-0.0427*** (0.0103)	-0.0291 (0.0182)	-0.00813 (0.00943)	-0.00244 (0.0177)	-0.0137 (0.0132)	0.00637 (0.00804)	0.0145** (0.00586)	-0.0104*** (0.00345)
Poor	-0.0788** (0.0340)	-0.0579*** (0.0199)	-0.0220 (0.0237)	-0.0225 (0.0137)	-0.0367 (0.0246)	-0.0176 (0.0167)	-0.0152 (0.0123)	-0.0105 (0.00776)	-0.00865 (0.00771)
Age Cat	0.0178*** (0.00653)	0.0126*** (0.00267)	0.0128*** (0.00452)	0.00687** (0.00270)	-0.0260*** (0.00386)	0.0162*** (0.00356)	0.00651*** (0.00229)	0.00632*** (0.00230)	0.00184* (0.00110)
Gender	0.228*** (0.0272)	-0.0468*** (0.0115)	-0.0765*** (0.0186)	-0.0263*** (0.00940)	-0.0339** (0.0170)	0.104*** (0.0118)	-0.0199** (0.00859)	-0.00587 (0.00525)	-0.0141*** (0.00436)
educ	0.0110* (0.00623)	0.0103*** (0.00276)	0.00124 (0.00460)	0.00339 (0.00250)	0.00766** (0.00337)	-0.000974 (0.00337)	0.00656*** (0.00209)	0.00228 (0.00163)	0.00161* (0.000835)
Constant	0.469*** (0.0848)	0.00212 (0.0360)	0.139** (0.0567)	0.0208 (0.0298)	0.265*** (0.0564)	-0.0227 (0.0486)	-0.0330 (0.0316)	-0.0398* (0.0210)	0.00794 (0.0124)
Observations	1450	1450	1450	1450	1450	1450	1450	1450	1450
R-squared	0.072	0.064	0.028	0.020	0.079	0.088	0.019	0.028	0.020

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table 26: Claimant on Land Policy

	Apartheid	Colonial	Farmworkers	Squatting I	Squatting	Gender	TAs	Producers	Tax All	Tax Whites	Force	Expropriate
[lem] Ineligible	-0.0268 (0.0540)	-0.00764 (0.0634)	-0.0495 (0.0672)	-0.136 (0.0876)	-0.110 (0.0806)	0.0564 (0.0621)	-0.0892 (0.0745)	-0.00291 (0.0957)	-0.206** (0.0919)	-0.326*** (0.0986)	-0.144* (0.0787)	-0.0357 (0.0769)
Clamaint	-0.153** (0.0757)	-0.279*** (0.103)	-0.236** (0.0919)	-0.167 (0.103)	-0.155 (0.103)	-0.270*** (0.0947)	-0.191* (0.110)	0.127 (0.125)	-0.0557 (0.131)	-0.0271 (0.129)	-0.159 (0.117)	-0.0671 (0.0989)
Harmed by Apartheid	0.192*** (0.0464)	0.155*** (0.0569)	0.248*** (0.0621)	0.122 (0.0779)	0.133* (0.0784)	0.180*** (0.0585)	0.236*** (0.0774)	-0.220** (0.0864)	-0.139 (0.0904)	0.191** (0.0911)	0.113 (0.0777)	0.357*** (0.0657)
Rural	0.123*** (0.0426)	0.0604 (0.0495)	0.0678 (0.0551)	0.0449 (0.0663)	-0.0508 (0.0618)	0.00637 (0.0515)	0.222*** (0.0646)	0.202*** (0.0701)	-0.0451 (0.0724)	0.0999 (0.0751)	0.171** (0.0665)	0.104* (0.0613)
Poor	-0.0111 (0.0566)	0.0105 (0.0630)	-0.153** (0.0656)	0.0770 (0.0823)	0.0594 (0.0789)	-0.0279 (0.0552)	-0.0495 (0.0833)	-0.0662 (0.0906)	0.0650 (0.0922)	-0.102 (0.0928)	-0.00163 (0.0862)	0.0155 (0.0772)
Age Cat	-0.00788 (0.0106)	0.000464 (0.0125)	-0.00553 (0.0134)	-0.00992 (0.0164)	-0.0115 (0.0159)	0.0132 (0.0135)	-0.0125 (0.0166)	-0.00952 (0.0173)	0.00556 (0.0185)	-0.0206 (0.0188)	-0.00497 (0.0167)	-0.0176 (0.0157)
Gender	0.0141 (0.0419)	0.0128 (0.0494)	0.114** (0.0543)	0.0812 (0.0653)	0.0434 (0.0621)	0.0754 (0.0528)	0.0253 (0.0635)	0.0932 (0.0706)	0.133* (0.0721)	0.0808 (0.0743)	0.0760 (0.0657)	-0.0271 (0.0592)
educ	0.00156 (0.00956)	0.00617 (0.0114)	0.00423 (0.0119)	-0.0214 (0.0148)	-0.0251* (0.0147)	0.0363*** (0.0133)	0.0365** (0.0154)	0.0151 (0.0164)	0.0384** (0.0164)	-0.000936 (0.0167)	0.0190 (0.0147)	0.00827 (0.0141)
Claims Knowledge	0.0351** (0.0153)	-0.00422 (0.0185)	0.00425 (0.0201)	-0.0479* (0.0254)	-0.0130 (0.0226)	0.0199 (0.0187)	-0.00837 (0.0237)	-0.0247 (0.0257)	0.0134 (0.0276)	-0.0282 (0.0283)	0.000320 (0.0240)	0.00335 (0.0215)
Land Knowledge	0.0121 (0.0233)	0.0738*** (0.0259)	0.0389 (0.0283)	-0.0195 (0.0341)	0.00163 (0.0321)	0.0237 (0.0277)	-0.00237 (0.0330)	0.00112 (0.0372)	-0.0445 (0.0364)	-0.0224 (0.0388)	0.0635* (0.0358)	0.0756** (0.0305)
Constant	4.264*** (0.135)	4.078*** (0.158)	4.084*** (0.162)	2.676*** (0.201)	2.527*** (0.197)	3.750*** (0.161)	3.502*** (0.205)	3.577*** (0.227)	3.029*** (0.227)	3.743*** (0.234)	3.669*** (0.197)	3.775*** (0.195)
Observations	1416	1418	1416	1409	1401	1399	1400	1402	1395	1402	1409	1404
R-squared	0.028	0.024	0.027	0.015	0.011	0.031	0.027	0.021	0.016	0.021	0.016	0.034

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

9.5 Policy Drivers

I include a second set of tests using a series of questions on people's perception of the importance of factors as the drivers of land reform policy. Tables ?? and ?? illustrate that land claimants are less likely to prioritizi following the law and they are less likely to direct land reform at addressing land inequality in comparison to the general population. This finding could well be because land claimants are frustrated with the slow, legalistic process of claiming land. They are also less likely to make redressing inequality a key priority of land reform. Thus, while land claimants want to move away from a legalistic process, land reform is less about general inequality and more about specific redress. In contrast, those harmed under apartheid are more likely to prioritize following the law, giving land to those who suffered, reducing inequality, targeting past injustices and targeting unfair land acquisition relative to the rest of the population. Their preferences, while more implicitly rule-abiding, are also much more inclusive and radical. What this extra analysis on a new set of variables shows is that there are differences between claimants and victims on questions beyond policy

reforms for land reform that are consistent with my findings.

Table 27: Claimant Category vs Eligible Non Claimants on Policy Drivers, Robustness

	Follow Law	Workers	Suffering	Inequality	Injustices	Unfair Acquisition
[Iem] Ineligible	-0.00619 (0.113)	0.0733 (0.139)	-0.0255 (0.128)	0.0366 (0.109)	0.0676 (0.121)	0.127 (0.131)
Clamaint	-0.353** (0.143)	0.198 (0.166)	0.101 (0.154)	-0.255* (0.149)	0.109 (0.149)	0.0404 (0.161)
Harmed by Apartheid	0.134* (0.0718)	-0.00115 (0.0951)	0.225*** (0.0863)	0.362*** (0.0768)	0.236*** (0.0841)	0.455*** (0.0833)
Rural	0.0868 (0.0654)	0.208*** (0.0804)	0.276*** (0.0783)	0.0295 (0.0720)	-0.0492 (0.0747)	0.0513 (0.0771)
Poor	0.0250 (0.0856)	0.0267 (0.102)	0.230** (0.100)	-0.000881 (0.0907)	0.159 (0.101)	0.0125 (0.104)
Age Cat	0.0288* (0.0160)	0.0278 (0.0200)	0.0109 (0.0188)	0.0155 (0.0180)	0.00130 (0.0179)	-0.00719 (0.0187)
Gender	0.0382 (0.0648)	0.153* (0.0800)	0.0579 (0.0769)	0.125* (0.0716)	0.0532 (0.0741)	0.0372 (0.0747)
educ	0.0291** (0.0146)	0.0237 (0.0184)	0.0161 (0.0176)	0.0272* (0.0154)	-0.00451 (0.0171)	0.00246 (0.0169)
Constant	3.648*** (0.204)	2.913*** (0.258)	3.044*** (0.248)	3.434*** (0.220)	3.600*** (0.237)	3.422*** (0.235)
Observations	1434	1410	1424	1428	1422	1411
R-squared	0.019	0.011	0.023	0.025	0.012	0.024

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

9.6 Qualitative Interview Evidence

In this paper, I rely on ten qualitative interviews to paint a more in-depth picture of the state of land claims bureaucracy and the perspectives of land claimants. I include interviews with four land claimants, two lawyers familiar with land claims, two state bureaucrats in land claims administration and one established farmer. Of these ten interviewees, eight were people of colour and five were women. This is broadly representative of South Africa's gender and racial breakdown. The interviews do not provide any additional causal leverage to my argument, but rather supplement past studies that detail the obstacles faced by land claimants.

Table 28 details these interviews. I conducted each of them with using a snowball sampling strategy with an IRB approved questionnaire in person before the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic. One interview was remote by phone by request of the interviewee due to difficulties in traveling. While many of my interviewees with land claimants were conducted in Gauteng province, they were done with land claimants from adjacent provinces (e.g. North West Province and Limpopo).

Table 28: Interview List

Citation	Times Cited	Remote
Interview: Land Claims Official I, September 2019. Western Cape.	1	0
Interview: Land Claims Official II, October 2019. Gauteng.	1	0
Interview: Land Claimant I, January 2020. Gauteng.	1	0
Interview: Land Claimant II, January 2020. North West.	1	1
Interview: Land Claimant III, January 2020. Gauteng.	1	0
Interview: Land Claimant IV, October 2019. Gauteng.	1	0
Interview: Lawyer I, October 2019. Gauteng.	1	0
Interview: Lawyer II, October 2019. Gauteng.	2	0
Interview: Development Professional, November 2019. Gauteng.	1	0
Interview: Farmer, February 2020. Gauteng.	1	0