The Determinants of Attitudes toward Government Paternalism: Evidence from the United States and Israel

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Abstract. The recently proposed Paternalism Acceptance Model suggests five policy-related determinants of public support for classic (coercive) and libertarian (non-coercive) government paternalism: coercion level, policy domain, effectiveness, promoter, and public consensus. Particularly, the model suggests that coercive policies dominate non-coercive policies in domains that relate to basic needs (e.g., safety and health), while non-coercive policies are generally preferred in domains pertaining to higher-order needs such as welfare and morals. However, thus far the evidence supporting the model are based on data only from the United States. The current research note replicates the model in Israel, a country which significantly differs from the United States in terms of public predispositions toward government intervention and coercion. The findings obtained provide strong support for the model, despite the anticipated differences in levels of support for government paternalism: Israelis view paternalism much more favorably than Americans. This attests to the prospect of generalizability of the model to other Western democracies and provides preliminary benchmarks of levels of support for different paternalistic policies in the two countries.

Key words: paternalism, nudges, public attitudes, cultural differences, Israel, US, replication

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Government paternalism refers to policies that aim to prevent individuals from inflicting self-harm, or to promote welfare-enhancing behaviors. Common examples include tobacco, alcohol and sugar taxes, mandatory retirement saving, and mandatory helmets and seatbelts. The recently introduced *Paternalism Acceptance Model* (Treger 2021) advances a theoretical framework which explains public attitudes toward Classic (Dworkin 1972; Conly 2013) and Libertarian (Thaler and Sunstein 2009) paternalism (also known as "nudge"), based on five policy-related determinants: coercion level, policy domain, effectiveness, promoter, and public consensus. Contrary to previous research that emphasizes the superiority of the libertarian non-coercive paternalism over the classic coercive approach (Diepeveen et al. 2013; Sunstein 2017; Sunstein and Reisch 2019), the model suggests that public preferences are contingent on the interaction between the coercion level and the policy domain, such that in domains that pertain to basic needs coercive policies will be preferred over non-coercive alternatives, and the opposite will be the case with higher order needs. The model also entails that the perceived effectiveness of the different types of paternalism is embedded in the coercion level, and drives preferences with coercive paternalism perceived as more effective. Public consensus is positively related to policy support and the promoter affects preferences through partisanship.

To date, the empirical evidence supporting this model are drawn from a single, albeit 'hard' case: the United States (henceforth: US). The American public is renowned for its aversion toward government intervention in general, and particularly in the private sphere – the target of paternalistic policies. To test the validity of the model beyond the US, this research note replicates the experimental design (conjoint) in Israel, a country which significantly differs from the US on relevant cultural aspects that relate to public sentiment toward government paternalism: national ethos, welfare regime, and degree of collectivism. The casual effects obtained in Israel are remarkably similar to the US results, providing additional support for the model. The resemblance of the causal effects is highlighted by the (expected) differences in levels of support for paternalism in the two countries: Americans are generally negatively predisposed toward such policies while Israelis support both coercive and non-coercive paternalism.

The findings increase the generalizability of the model, and suggest it could be applicable to other Western democracies which are located in-between Israel and the US in terms of public sentiment toward government intervention. This in turn can inform policymaking well beyond these two countries, especially in light of policy diffusion.

The Paternalism Acceptance Model

The *Paternalism Acceptance Model* entails that support for coercive and non-coercive government paternalism is contingent on five policy-related attributes: coercion level, policy domain, effectiveness, promoter, and public consensus (Treger 2021). Figure 1 presents the main hypotheses of the model. It was advanced to explain the prevalence of coercive paternalistic policies in contemporary public policy and to qualify the perceived superiority of the nudge approach (Sunstein 2017; Sunstein and Reisch 2019). The model focuses on preferences of individuals who are the subject of such policies. The empirical evidence obtained in the US provide substantial support for the model. Concretely, the interaction between the policy domain and coercion level affects support such that in domains that relate to basic needs, support for classic paternalism is higher than or not different from, support for nudges. By contrast, in the welfare and morals domains, individuals significantly prefer non-coercive policies. The results show that individuals care about the way policy goals are promoted, as the effects of the coercion level attribute were the largest. Additionally, perceptions of effectiveness are embedded in the coercion level, with coercive policies perceived as more effective. Public support matters too: information about majority support (even a small majority) for the policies increases the likelihood of favoring the policy. Source cues only affect support through partisanship, in a manner that reflects partisan polarization in the US (Treger forthcoming).



Figure 1: Paternalism Acceptance Model: The interaction between coercion level and policy domain (source: Treger 2021).

Macro-level Differences between Israel and the US

Notwithstanding the results obtained in the US, the question is whether the model is valid in other countries with different political and cultural contexts. As a first step to answering this question, the current research note replicates the US study in Israel. The two countries differ on several cultural aspects that relate directly to the interaction between coerciveness and policy domain, which is a key feature of the model.[2] These aspects include: the scope of the 'welfare state'; the societal goals and values embedded in the national ethos; and the degree of collectivism (compared to individualism). These aspects stem from the country's political culture and shape the public legitimacy for government intervention in representative democracies.

The scope and breadth of a country's 'welfare state' has to do with the social services citizens receive from their government or expect it to provide them. This relates to the degree to which citizens are accustomed to government intervention in the private and public spheres, and also to what citizens perceive as the basic needs that should be guaranteed for everyone (i.e., social rights). This can be a source of cross-national variation regarding the domains and goals that are considered 'basic' in different countries. It is possible that in countries with more comprehensive welfare regimes, the perception of what constitutes basic needs is broader, and consequently there will be higher support for government paternalism, possibly in more policy domains. Countries also differ in terms of collectivism - the extent to which citizens view themselves first and foremost as individuals compared to members of the national collective (or in-group). This underlies how willing they are to place some collective and national interests before their own, and informs adherence to authority, especially in favor of the publicly defined 'good' and 'welfare'. Collectivist cultures emphasize social cohesion, are more traditional and hierarchical and defer more to authority. Individualist cultures emphasize personal autonomy, self-determination, and are more liberal (Hofstede 1984; Inglehart 1977; 2006). Finally, the national ethos has to do with the goals and values a given society emphasizes and is related to the other two aspects. Its relevance to the Paternalism Acceptance Model manifests through the salience and importance assigned to different policy domains and goals along the policy domain continuum. It can also be related to

[2] Obviously the US and Israel differ with respect to additional macro-level dimensions, such as the political system. Here I focus on differences that are relevant to public attitudes toward government paternalism.

general attitudes toward government coercion and intervention, if the national ethos emphasizes (discards) autonomy, individualism, and non-interference.

Notably the US can be viewed as a benchmark case with respect to these aspects. It is characterized by a liberal welfare regime (Esping-Andersen 1990) which is substantially limited and less generous compared to that of European countries (Alesina et al. 2001; Orloff et al. 1988). Its national ethos emphasizes civil liberties and self-determination, which are enshrined in the American constitution and its amendments. Indeed, Americans score higher compared to citizens of most countries on self-expression and post-materialist values, suggesting that the US public assigns high importance to autonomy and freedom of choice (Inglehart 2006; World Values Survey 2022). Finally, the US was found as the most individualistic country in Hofstede's (1984) comparative study on cultural dimensions.

By contrast, Israel's 'welfare state' is much more comprehensive than the American, having been established on socio-democratic foundations and significant government involvement (Gal 2010; Gal and Benish 2018). Recent studies show that Israelis exhibit high levels of support for redistribution, expanded social expenditure, and preference for the social economic approach over the capitalist approach, in a manner that cuts across political camps (Cohen et al. 2008; Shalev 2016; Volter 2011). As to the national ethos, the Israeli (Jewish) culture has developed around concerns of national security, with the protracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict significantly shaping Israeli politics and foreign affairs for decades (Sheafer, Weimann and Tsfati 2008; Shamir and Shamir 1993; Yuchtman-Ya'ar 2003). This context led to the regular introduction of highly coercive measures by the state (e.g., a continuous legal "State of Emergency" and mandatory military service for all the citizens, to this very day), justified by appeals to the most basic needs: survival, security, and safety. Finally, Israeli society is much more collectivist than the US (Hofstede 1984). The collectivism of the Israeli Jewish population stems from, and is facilitated by, the common ethnic origin, the socialist foundations and the continues security threat. Therefore, Israel emphasizes civic duty, the survival and perseverance of the Jewish state, even at the expense of personal liberties.

Based on these differences, I expect levels of support for government paternalism to be higher in Israel compared to the US. Moreover, it is likely that Americans are negatively predisposed toward government paternalism while Israelis are expected to view it favorably. Therefore, finding

empirical support for the *Paternalism Acceptance Model* in Israel as well, will significantly enhance the prospect of its generalizability.

Method and Data

The model was tested using a conjoint experiment (Bansak et al. 2021; Hainmueller et al. 2014) in the US (the original study) and Israel (the current study). The US study was administered among a national sample (N=1,370) via Lucid between September 17 and October 28, 2019. The Israeli study was administered among a sample of the Israeli Jewish population (N=1,170) through iPanel.[3] Both samples were recruited using quotas on key demographic indicators, therefore both are representative of their respective populations (with the caveat that they are drawn from opt-in online panels). Full sample demographics and comparison to population benchmarks can be found in Appendix Section A.

The conjoint experiment consists of tasks that present participants with comparisons between two hypothetical policy proposals that varied randomly along five attributes: Policy - representing the coercion level, and drawn from the Intervention Matrix (see Appendix Section B); Estimated effectiveness of the proposal by experts; Promoter (identity of the proposal's promoter); Public support rates for the proposal; Full implementation due date. The content of the conjoint experiment was identical in the US and Israel, except for the promoter attribute, which was adjusted to fit the local political context (see footnote 4). This allows for straightforward comparisons between the results in the two countries. Table 1 presents the full list of policy attributes and their values. The order of the attributes was randomized between and within respondents, to reduce ordering effects. To construct the conjoint, I used the Conjoint SDT software (Strezhnev et al. 2013).

Each participant was randomly assigned to one policy goal in each of the four policy domains: safety, health, welfare, and morals. A short introduction preceded each policy goal, stating what the desired end state would be, so that effectiveness could be evaluated against a shared and more tangible goal (the wording of the introduction for each goal is provided in Appendix Section B). The order of policy domains was randomized between respondents.

[3] At the time, there was no online panel company that had a high-quality panel of the Arab Israeli population.

Table 1: The list of possible attribute values in the conjoint experiment

Attributes	**Values** (The baselevel category for each attribute in bold)
Policy	Information campaign/warning, **default/decision point,** tax/restriction, ban/ mandate (assigned according to the Intervention Matrix presented in Section B in the Appendix)
Estimated effectiveness of the proposal by experts	**Somewhat effective,** Effective, Very effective, Unknown
Public support rates for the proposal	**20%-30%,** 35%-45%, 55%-65%, 75%-85%, Unknown
Promoter[4]	**Center MK,** Left-wing MK, Right-wing MK, The Government, Government ministry, Non-governmental organization (NGO), Private company
Full implementation due date	**A year from now,** 3 years from now

The unit of analysis in conjoint experiments is the object embedded in the profile, not the participant. Therefore, the unit of analysis in this study is the policy proposal. Each participant was presented with two comparisons of hypothetical policy proposals for each policy goal, this results in 16 policy proposals rated by each participant. In the US sample this amounts to 21,920 policy proposals for the entire sample, with 5,480 in each policy domain. In the Israeli sample this amounts to 17,616 policy proposals for the entire sample, with 4,404 proposals in each policy domain. Each comparison was displayed as a table on a separate screen. Fig. 2 provides an example of a comparison and a policy goal introduction for the health policy domain.

The dependent variable is the rating outcome for each policy proposal,[5] dichotomized into a binary outcome of "Supported" coded 1 if the proposal was rated 5-7, and 0 otherwise. Following the standard practice for analyzing conjoint experiments using binary dependent variables (see: Bansak et al. 2016; 2021; Bechtel et al. 2017; Hainmueller et al. 2014), I use linear probability models with respondent fixed effects and clustered standard errors. For more details on the conjoint experiment, see Appendix Section B.

[4] In the US study the levels on this attribute were: Republican politician, Democrat politician, Member of Congress, Federal agency, Private company, Non-governmental organization (NGO). Private company was the baselevel.
[5] The wording of the question is: *If proposal 1[2] is introduced, how much will you support it on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 indicates that you will oppose it a great deal and 7 indicates you will favor it a great deal?*

Healthy Nutrition
There is a current debate on the topic of **healthy nutrition.**
The following are descriptions of policy proposals to **promote healthy nutrition.** Their aim is to decrease the number of people who are overweight or obese.
Please read the proposals carefully, and answer the 3 questions below.

	Proposal 1	**Proposal 2**
Promoter	Private company	Private company
Full implementation due date	A year from now	3 years from now
Policy	Ban on extremely unhealthy food products	Tax on unhealthy food products
Estimated effectiveness of the proposal by experts	Very effective	Effective
Public support rates for the proposal	75%-80%	20%-30%

Figure 2: An example of a comparison (task) in the conjoint experiment

Results

Levels of support for government paternalism are much higher in Israel than in the US

I begin with a comparison of *levels* of support toward paternalistic policies in Israel and the US, to establish that these indeed differ. Fig. 3 reports the marginal means (MMs) of support in each country in the pooled sample (that includes all four domains). It is easy to see that the favorability of Israelis and Americans toward policy proposals differs across most of the attributes. Concretely, for Israelis all of the attributes make it more likely that they will support the policy than not. Only tax/restriction are not statistically distinguishable from the 0.5 probability of supporting the policy (the null). The picture is nearly flipped for Americans. Most of the attributes make them unlikely to support the policy proposals. The two exceptions that will render Americans supportive of the polices are if it is an information campaign, or if the policy enjoys very high public support (75%-85) (with marginal means of 0.552 and 0.538, respectively). Several attributes are not different from a coin flip: a nudge, the support of a modest majority (55%-65%), effective and very effective policies, and non-political promoters (i.e., an NGO or a private company). Both Americans and Israelis are least likely to support taxes/restrictions, but unlike Israelis, these make Americans

significantly less likely to support the policy, with a marginal mean of 0.414 (se=0.006). Full report of the marginal means can be found in model 1 in Appendix Tables C1 and C2.



Figure 3: Marginal means of the policy attributes in the pooled Israeli and US samples. Note: N=17,616 in the Israeli sample; N=21,920 in the US sample.

To summarize, generally, Israelis are favorably predisposed toward paternalistically motivated polices, regardless of their specific features. Americans, by contrast, are predominantly opposed to paternalistic policies, unless they are not coercive or enjoy the support of the majority of the public. This allows me to establish the differences in levels of support, that were expected based on the macro-level differences between the two countries.



Figure 4: Marginal means of the coercion level, across domains in the Israeli and US samples

Next, I generated the marginal means of support in each country, within each policy domain. Fig. 4 presents only the marginal means on the coercion level (full report of marginal means by policy domain can be found in models 2-5 in Appendix Tables C1 and C2). This analysis also presents the general finding that Israelis are more supportive of paternalistic policies than Americans, but there are some unique patterns in each country. In Israel, only taxes/restrictions in the safety domain and bans/mandates in the Morals domain will make Israelis more likely to oppose the policy proposal. With these two exceptions, Israelis are likely to either support paternalistically motivated policies, or not be affected by the coercion level (with marginal means not different from 0.5) across domains. Information campaigns are favored in all the domains, and bans/mandates in all domains except morals. Taxes/restrictions are supported in the basic-needs domains, but do not affect support in the higher order needs domains. In the US, across domains respondents are unlikely to support coercive polices – they either do not affect their support or decrease it. Information campaigns are favored in all the domains, except morals. Americans are more likely to oppose nudges in the basic-needs domains.

Determinants of support for government paternalism

Having established the differences in *levels* of support in both countries, I turn now to the core examination of the patterns of the *causal effects* of the policy-related attributes on support for the paternalistic policies, and test whether they are in line with the *Paternalism Acceptance Model* despite of the differences in levels of support. Fig. 5 presents the Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) of the different attributes on support in the pooled sample (full results can be found in model 1 in Appendix Tables C3 and C4). It is evident that the patterns of support are very similar in both countries. The one notable difference is that in Israel bans/mandates increase support compared to nudges ($b=0.040$, $p<.001$), while in the US they decrease it ($b=-0.086$, $p<.001$).



Figure 5: Causal effects of all the policy attributes in the pooled US and Israeli samples.

To test the main hypotheses regarding the interaction between policy domain and coercion level, Fig. 6 displays the effect of the coercion level in each policy domain (full results can be found in models 2-5 in Tables C3 and C4 in the Appendix). The Israeli results provide substantial support for the model, and are even more in line with it than the US findings. This is because in Israel the effects of the coercive polices in the safety domain are large and significant (b=0.108, and b=0.327 for taxes/restrictions and ban/mandates, respectively). Israelis are also indifferent between nudges and bans/mandates in the welfare domain, which is counter to the model's prediction, but at the same time provides additional support for the argument that nudges are not always preferred over coercive policies. Another difference between Israel and the US is that Americans prefer information policies the most in the domains pertaining to basic needs, while Israelis do not.



Figure 6: Effects of coercion level on the probability of support for the proposal, by policy domains in the US and Israeli samples.

The high support for the coercive paternalistic polices in the safety domain, found in Israel can be possibly explained by the Israeli emphasis on national security and personal safety. Although these are not the same, it is still the case that the Israeli public is very accustomed to have issues pertaining to security and safety regulated by the government. A possible explanation for the absence of difference in preference toward the most coercive policies and nudges in the welfare domain in Israel (unlike the US), may be that Israelis also perceive the welfare domain as part of their basic needs due to the Israel's relatively comprehensive welfare regime. Indeed, in Israel both

policy goals in this domain – retirement savings and limit on weekly working hours – are part of the welfare legislation. Thus, it is possible Israelis are more accustomed to coercive intervention in this domain as well. This could explain the deviation from the model, by suggesting that in different countries more domains may be considered as basic.

Conclusion

To conclude, the aim of this research note was to replicate the evidence in support of the *Paternalism Acceptance Model* that were obtained in the US. To that end, I administered an identical conjoint experiment in Israel, a country which differs from the US in terms of its welfare regime, degree of collectivism and issues and values emphasized by the national ethos. These three macro-level aspects underlie part of the political culture in each country, and relate to the two main determinants of the model: coercion level and policy domain.

I have shown that in both countries the causal effects of the five policy attributes generally support the model, despite the cultural differences which as expected manifest in different levels of support for government paternalism. Strikingly, while Israelis are much more favorably predisposed toward government paternalism than are Americans, the causal patterns generally hold in both countries. These findings attest to the robustness of the model, and increase the prospects of generalizing the findings beyond these two cases. They also suggest that base levels of support for government paternalism may be determined by national culture comprised of macro-level indicators. Future comparative research should test the model in additional countries that differ from Israel and the US in terms of their welfare regime (e.g., countries with more clear-cut social-democratic welfare regime and a conservative regime), degree of collectivism, and the issues and values central to the national ethos. This will allow to further test the robustness of the model, and expand it to incorporate macro-level indicators that could account for deviations and cross-national variation.

The findings also have implications to policymaking, because they provide additional empirical support for a model that explains public preferences toward coercive and non-coercive government paternalism. Understanding the determinants of public support can inform policymaking in Israel and the US, but potentially in other countries as well, by helping policymakers be responsive to their constituencies and represent preferences regarding the means to achieve desired social goals. This is especially relevant, as policy diffuses and countries learn and imitate each other and often

embrace policies enacted by neighbors (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013; Meseguer and Gilardi 2009; Shipan and Volden 2012).

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Appendix

Section A: Sample Demographics

Table A1: US Sample compared to population benchmarks on key demographic indicators

	Current Population Survey 2018	N = 1,370 Sample
Gender		
Male	48%	44%
Female	52%	56%
Age		
18-24	12%	8%
25-34	18%	16%
35-44	16%	16%
45-54	17%	17%
55-64	17%	19%
65+	21%	25%
Education		
Less than high school graduate	11%	3%
High school graduate	29%	31%
Some college or associate degree	28%	32%
Bachelor's degree	21%	22%
Advanced degree	12%	12%
Race		
White	77%	82%
Black or African	13%	12%
American Indian	1%	1%
Asian	6%	5%
Native Hawaiian	0%	0%
Two or more	3%	0%
Region of residence		
Midwest	21%	23%
Northeast	18%	18%
South	38%	39%
West	24%	21%
Household annual income		
Less than $15,000	7%	9%
$15,000 to $24,999	7%	13%
$25,000 to $34,999	8%	12%
$35,000 to $49,999	11%	16%
$50,000 to $74,999	17%	17%
$75,000 to $99,999	14%	17%
$100,000 and over	36%	15%

Table A2: Israeli sample compared to population benchmarks on key demographic indicators (Jews only)

	Central Bureau of Statistics 2018*	N = 1,101 Sample
Gender		
Male	48%	50%
Female	52%	50%
Age		
18-24	14%	12%
25-34	20%	19%
35-44	19%	18%
45-54	15%	15%
55-64	14%	15%
65+	19%	22%
Education		
Less than high school graduate	13%	9%
High school graduate w/o matriculation	16%	23%
High school graduate w matriculation	20%	11%
Post-secondary (non-academic)	16%	17%
Bachelor's degree	22%	24%
Masters degree or higher	14%	17%
Origin**		
Israeli	31%	37%
Asia/Africa	31%	20%
Europe/America	38%	26%
From the former USSR		
Yes	14%	16%
Religiosity		
Secular	43%	41%
Traditional	35%	36%
Religious	11%	12%
Haredi (v. religious)	10%	11%
Region of residence		
Tel Aviv and Center	40%	48%
Jerusalem area	17%	18%
South	15%	13%
Haifa and North	28%	22%

Note: ** Origin by respondent's place of birth or father's place of birth.

Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel 2018 (no. 69) / Israel's 2018 Social Survey (for 20 year old+).

Section B: Conjoint Experiment

The study includes policies in four policy domains: Safety, Health, Welfare and Morals. Each domain includes two different policy goals as presented in Table A1.

Table B1: Policy domains and policy goals

Policy domain	Policy goal
Safety	Safety when riding electric bicycles
	Swimming safety in public places
Health	Smoking reduction
	Promotion of healthier nutrition
Welfare	Promotion of retirement savings
	Limit on the number of weekly working hours
Morals	Limit on euthanasia
	Reduction of pornography consumption

Every policy goal was assigned four different policies according to the four-point scale of intrusiveness-coerciveness: 1) information; 2) nudge (default or decision point); 3) tax or restriction; 4) ban or mandate. This yielded thirty-two policies presented in the Intervention Matrix (Table A2 below). These policies were then integrated into the conjoint experiment – these are the values on the coercion level attribute. This matrix was used in both the US and Israeli studies to enable direct comparisons between public attitudes in the two countries

Notably, participants in the studies were not aware of the analytical assignment of policies into policy domains nor to a given coercion level. For example, respondents who received the policy "tax on tobacco products" had no indication that in the Intervention Matrix I constructed, this policy is paternalistic and belongs to the health domain. Moreover, the survey did not include the words "nudge" or "paternalism".

Table B2: The Intervention Matrix used in the Conjoint Experiment

Policy Domain		**Safety**		**Health**		**Welfare**		**Morals**	
	Policy Goal / **Intervention**	**Riding electric bicycles safely**	**Swimming safety in public places**	**Healthy nutrition**	**Smoking reduction**	**Retirement savings**	**Working hours**	**Euthanasia**	**Pornography consumption**
Non-Coercive	**Information**	Information campaign on the importance of safety while riding an electric bicycle	Information campaign on the importance of swimming safety in public places	Information campaign on the importance of healthy nutrition	Information campaign on the dangers of smoking	Information campaign on the importance of retirement savings	Information campaign on the hazards of excessive working	Information campaign on euthanasia and its implications	Information campaign on the negative effects of pornography consumption
	Nudge (Default/ Decision point)	City hall will automatically enroll buyers of electric bicycles to a meeting on riding safety with an option to opt-out	City hall will automatically enroll citizens to a meeting on swimming safety in public places with an option to opt-out	Pop-up notification for unhealthy food items at the cash-register requesting the customer to confirm the purchase	Pop-up notification for tobacco products at the cash-register requesting the customer to confirm the purchase	Automatic enrollment into a retirement savings plan with an option to opt-out	Employees have to be asked in advance whether they agree to work over 40 hours a week	Requiring individuals who wish to undergo euthanasia or their family members to participate in a couple of information sessions on the implications	TV packages and web browsers will be pornography-free. Individuals who wish to consume pornography will have to opt-in
Coercive	**Tax/ Restriction**	Requiring compulsory insurance against self-inflicted accidents for electric bicycle owners with discounts for careful riders	Fee for swimming in public places in the absence of a lifeguard	Tax on unhealthy food products	Tax on tobacco products	Annual tax imposed on people who do not save for retirement	Fee for employers whose employees work over 40 hours a week	Restrictive eligibility criteria for undergoing euthanasia	Tax on the consumption of pornography
	Ban/ Mandate	Requiring license for riding an electric bicycle	Ban on swimming in public places in the absence of a lifeguard	Ban on extremely unhealthy food products	Ban on smoking in public	Mandatory saving for retirement	Ban on working over 40 hours a week	Ban on euthanasia	Ban on consumption of pornography

Each participant was randomly assigned to one policy goal in each of the four policy domains. A short introduction preceded each policy goal, stating what the desired end state would be, so that effectiveness could be evaluated against a shared and more tangible goal. The wording of the introduction for each goal are listed below:

1. **Riding an electric bicycle:** There is a current debate on the topic of **safety while riding an electric bicycle.** The following are descriptions of policy proposals to **promote safe riding.** Their aim is to reduce injuries to electric bicycle users.
2. **Swimming in public places:** Currently there is a public debate about **swimming safety in public places such as in the ocean and in public swimming pools.** The following are descriptions of policy proposals to **promote swimming safety in public places.** Their aim is to reduce cases of drowning.
3. **Smoking:** Currently there is a public debate about the effects of **smoking.** The following are descriptions of policy proposals to **reduce smoking,** which aim to decrease the number of smokers, as well as smoking intensity.
4. **Healthy nutrition:** There is a current debate on the topic of **healthy nutrition.** The following are descriptions of policy proposals to **promote healthy nutrition.** Their aim is to decrease the number of people who are overweight or obese.
5. **Retirement savings:** There is a current debate on the topic of **savings for retirement years.** The following are descriptions of policy proposals to **promote saving for retirement,** that aim to increase the number of people who save for retirement.
6. **Working hours:** Currently there is a public debate about the number of **working hours (per week).** The following are descriptions of policy proposals to **limit the number of working hours (per week),** that aim to decrease the number of people who overwork.
7. **Euthanasia:** There is a current debate on the topic of **euthanasia.** Euthanasia is the practice of intentionally ending a life to relieve pain and suffering of terminally ill people who have no chance of getting better or recovering from their illness. The following are descriptions of policy proposals to **reduce cases of euthanasia.** Their aim is to reduce the number of people who choose to undergo euthanasia.

8. **Pornography consumption:** Currently there is a public debate on **pornography consumption.** The following are descriptions of policy proposals to **reduce consumption of pornography.** Their aim is to decrease the number of people who consume pornography and the intensity of their consumption.

Section C: Regression Results

Table C1: Marginal means from linear probability models. DV: Supported. Israeli sample.

	(1) **Pooled**	(2) **Safety**	(3) **Health**	(4) **Welfare**	(5) **Morals**
Coercion Level					
Info	0.622	0.631	0.661	0.588	0.590
	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Nudge	0.569	0.438	0.511	0.666	0.669
	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Tax/Restriction	0.514	0.546	0.550	0.468	0.496
	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Ban/Mandate	0.608	0.765	0.619	0.669	0.380
	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Public Support					
20%-30%	0.551	0.538	0.560	0.568	0.510
	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)
35%-45%	0.568	0.591	0.575	0.581	0.522
	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.017)
55%-65%	0.590	0.600	0.601	0.619	0.530
	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)
75%-85%	0.626	0.650	0.652	0.652	0.579
	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)
unknown	0.558	0.589	0.543	0.580	0.532
	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Effectiveness					
Somewhat effective	0.546	0.571	0.526	0.564	0.488
	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Effectiveness	0.596	0.624	0.614	0.619	0.546
	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Very effective	0.616	0.620	0.633	0.666	0.577
	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Unknown	0.556	0.565	0.571	0.551	0.524
	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Promoter					
Center MK	0.576	0.596	0.572	0.588	0.511
	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Govt. Ministry	0.589	0.606	0.609	0.622	0.554
	(0.009)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Left-wing MK	0.557	0.554	0.564	0.584	0.525
	(0.009)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
NGO	0.574	0.612	0.589	0.585	0.530
	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Private company	0.584	0.595	0.592	0.572	0.562
	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Right-wing MK	0.580	0.578	0.603	0.617	0.497
	(0.009)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.021)
The government	0.590	0.622	0.576	0.627	0.554
	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.019)

Full implementation due date					
3 years from now	0.568	0.576	0.567	0.578	0.535
	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
A year from now	0.589	0.614	0.607	0.621	0.533
	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Observations	17,616	4,404	4,404	4,404	4,404
Respondents	1,101	1,101	1,101	1,101	1,101

Standard errors in parentheses.

Table C2: Marginal means from linear probability models. DV: Supported. US sample.

	(1) **Pooled**	(2) **Safety**	(3) **Health**	(4) **Welfare**	(5) **Morals**
Coercion Level					
Info	0.552	0.592	0.606	0.544	0.479
	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Nudge	0.511	0.43	0.413	0.657	0.573
	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Tax/Restriction	0.414	0.398	0.485	0.332	0.426
	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Ban/Mandate	0.425	0.484	0.464	0.383	0.348
	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Public Support					
20%-30%	0.448	0.464	0.451	0.429	0.414
	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.015)
35%-45%	0.463	0.457	0.506	0.461	0.436
	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)
55%-65%	0.496	0.488	0.536	0.501	0.501
	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)
75%-85%	0.538	0.529	0.563	0.566	0.510
	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)
unknown	0.431	0.436	0.411	0.431	0.414
	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Effectiveness					
Somewhat effective	0.448	0.433	0.466	0.448	0.431
	(0.005)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Effective	0.502	0.501	0.513	0.522	0.472
	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Very effective	0.512	0.522	0.544	0.516	0.500
	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Unknown	0.439	0.446	0.449	0.422	0.419
	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Promoter					
Democrat politician	0.458	0.417	0.508	0.448	0.416
	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Federal government	0.474	0.482	0.493	0.487	0.455
	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Member of Congress	0.469	0.497	0.479	0.448	0.461
	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
NGO	0.485	0.473	0.499	0.507	0.504
	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Private Company	0.487	0.49	0.495	0.499	0.441
	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Republican politician	0.477	0.492	0.483	0.471	0.453
	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Full implementation due date					
3 years from now	0.469	0.464	0.487	0.468	0.449
	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
A year from now	0.481	0.487	0.499	0.486	0.462

	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Observations	21,920	5,480	5,480	5,480	5,480
Respondents	1,370	1,370	1,370	1,370	1,370

Standard errors in parentheses

Table C3: Linear probability model results, by coercion level. Dependent variable: Supported. Israeli sample.

	Pooled	Safety	Health	Welfare	Morals
Coercion Level (Base category: Default/Decision)					
Information	0.054***	0.193***	0.150***	-0.077**	-0.079***
	(0.012)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.023)
Tax/Restriction	-0.055***	0.108***	0.039	-0.198***	-0.173***
	(0.012)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.023)
Ban/Mandate	0.040***	0.327***	0.108***	0.003	-0.289***
	(0.012)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Public Support (Base category: 20%-30%)					
35%-45%		0.052*	0.015	0.013	0.012
	0.017	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
55%-65%	(0.011)	0.062*	0.041	0.050	0.020
	0.039***	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)
75%-85%	(0.012)	0.112***	0.092***	0.084***	0.069**
	0.075***	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.026)
unknown	(0.012)	0.051	-0.017	0.011	0.022
	0.007	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)
Effectiveness (Base category: Somewhat Effective)				(0.012)	
Effective	0.050***	0.053*	0.088***	0.054*	0.058*
	(0.010)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Very effective	0.069***	0.049*	0.107***	0.102***	0.089***
	(0.011)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Unknown	0.010	-0.006	0.046*	-0.013	0.037
	(0.010)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Promoter (Base category: Center MK)					
Left-wing MK	-0.019	-0.043	-0.008	-0.004	0.014
	(0.014)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Right-wing MK	0.005	-0.019	0.031	0.029	-0.014
	(0.014)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)
The government	0.014	0.026	0.004	0.039	0.043
	(0.013)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)
Govt. Ministry	0.014	0.010	0.037	0.034	0.043
	(0.014)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)
NGO	-0.002	0.015	0.017	-0.003	0.019
	(0.014)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Private company	0.009	-0.002	0.020	-0.016	0.051
	(0.014)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Full implementation due date (Base category: A year from now)					
3 years from now	-0.021**	-0.038*	-0.041**	-0.043**	0.002
	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Constant	0.516***	0.378***	0.430***	0.610***	0.575***
	(0.015)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.033)
Observations	17,616	4,404	4,404	4,404	4,404
R-squared	0.016	0.083	0.034	0.048	0.066
Number of respondents	1,101	1,101	1,101	1,101	1,101
Respondent FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table C4: Linear probability models results by policy domains. Dependent variable: Supported. US sample.

	Pooled	Safety	Health	Welfare	Morals
Coercion Level (Base category: Default/Decision)					
Information	0.041***	0.162***	0.193***	-0.113***	-0.095***
	(0.010)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.020)
Tax/Restriction	-0.097***	-0.033	0.072**	-0.325***	-0.148***
	(0.010)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Ban/Mandate	-0.086***	0.054*	0.052*	-0.274***	-0.226***
	(0.011)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Public Support (Base category: 20%-30%)					
35%-45%	0.015	-0.007	0.056*	0.032	0.022
	(0.010)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.023)
55%-65%	0.048***	0.023	0.085***	0.072**	0.087***
	(0.010)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.023)
75%-85%	0.090***	0.065**	0.112***	0.137***	0.096***
	(0.011)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)
unknown	-0.017	-0.029	-0.040	0.002	-0.000
	(0.010)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Effectiveness (Base category: Somewhat Effective)					
Effective	0.054***	0.068***	0.047*	0.074***	0.041*
	(0.009)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Very effective	0.063***	0.089***	0.078***	0.068***	0.069***
	(0.009)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Unknown	-0.009	0.013	-0.017	-0.025	-0.012
	(0.009)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Promoter (Base category: Private company)					
Democrat politician	-0.029*	-0.074**	0.013	-0.051*	-0.025
	(0.012)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Federal government	-0.013	-0.008	-0.002	-0.012	0.014
	(0.011)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Member of Congress	-0.018	0.007	-0.016	-0.051*	0.020
	(0.011)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Non-governmental organization (NGO)	-0.002	-0.018	0.004	0.008	0.063*
	(0.011)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Republican politician	-0.010	0.002	-0.012	-0.028	0.012
	(0.011)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Full implementation due date (Base category: A year from now)					
3 years from now	-0.012	-0.023	-0.012	-0.018	-0.013
	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Constant	0.475***	0.404***	0.352***	0.610***	0.500***
	(0.013)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)
Observations	21,920	5,480	5,480	5,480	5,480
R-squared	0.028	0.043	0.047	0.101	0.051
Number of respondents	1,370	1,370	1,370	1,370	1,370
Respondent Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

References for the Appendix

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